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ABSTRACT
In the United States, it is widely recognized that racial and ethnic minorities
now constitute an ever-expanding share of the general population. While this
growth has catapulted minorities to the forefront of the public sector’s clientele,
its implications for how bureaucracies serve these groups remain understudied.
Using the Latino demographic and educational organizations as a policy setting,
I estimate a series of statistical models to assess the determinants of group access
to positions of authority in publicly governed school districts and what this ac-
cess portends for minority student outcomes. While I find that a strong numeric
presence in surrounding communities dictates Latinos’ access to school district
leadership, I also find that institutional design moderates the extent to which their
numeric stength translates into organizational influence. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, statistical analyses herein indicate that citizenship status and patterns of
in-school policy implementation are related in a manner that underscores unique
behavioral incentives. The findings also indicate that once Latinos become leaders
in the policy-making process, performance-related pressures influence their deci-
sion to improve certain policy outcomes over others. Through these findings, my
dissertation sheds new light on the ways in which representation in locally elected
governance and bureaucratic hierarchies shapes Latinos’ footing in the American
education system. Importantly, the results of this dissertation also lead to the con-
clusion that Latinos’ prospects for political incorporation is a function of institu-
tions that shape the composition of governmental bureaucracies, along with orga-
nizational pressures to improve the performance of governmenal programs.
ii
DEDICATION
For my Mother.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The best way to begin my acknowledgements is by admitting that I am truly
grateful. I am grateful for the opportunity to be at this curious point in life, both
in the personal and professional sense. And I am grateful that thanks to so many
people I miraculously remained at Texas A&MUniversity, somehow survivingmy
doctoral program. Now, I suppose that I should try to answer the following ques-
tion: To whom am I indebted?
The truth is that first and foremost, I cannot take sole credit for any of my life’s
achievements. I am but one piece of a larger puzzle composed ofmany individuals
who lifted me up, time and time again, when I needed it the most. All I’ve done
is put to good use (or at least what I believe to be good use) the tools, gifts, and
support that so many wonderful people have so selflessly given me. My first year
as a doctoral student was one of the most trying periods of my life. I was alone. I
was miserable. I was deeply depressed. Were it not for the support of my closest
friends and family, I would’ve left for a full-time job in a city many miles from
College Station.
When I thought that I’d endured more than I could, my dearest friends Steven
Gonzalez and Joshua Herrera (I view them as nothing less than brothers) con-
vincedme that leaving the PhD programwould be a hugemistake that, eventually,
I would come to regret. Of course, they each had their unique perspectives, but
what they said worked. And I’m glad I listened. What’s more, I’m glad that they
loved me enough to prevent me from giving up on myself. Steve and Josh, thank
you.
iv
I come from a relatively small family. During the holidays or other special oc-
casions, when we’re all under the same roof, there are no more than 7 or 8 of us.
I thank all of them. In particular, I would like to thank my two sisters, Nadia and
Bianca, and my grandmother, Lucia Orozco. My grandmother spoiled, loved, and
protected me to help give me an amazing life. I miss her dearly every day. I would
also like to thankmy father, Angel LuisMolina. He has been extremely supportive
of me, pushing me to make decisions that I won’t regret when I’m his age. We’ve
always had an interesting relationship, one that has been far fromperfect. Still, he’s
there for me precisely when I need him the most. I love and respect him beyond
measure. He is a big part of why I’m finally able to write a letter of acknowledg-
ments attached to a dissertation.
During my first year as a graduate student, I had the tremendous fortune to
meet Brian Shreck, Cameron Wimpy, Soren Jordan, Carla Flink, Blake Garcia, and
Clay Webb. During my second year I would meet Mallory Compton and Nathan
Favero (Nathan was still an undergraduate at the time). These people are invalu-
able to me, and I’m proud to call them my colleagues as well as my friends. Not
only do they motivate me to become better at this profession, they’ve also helped
me become a better person. I hope that they remain a part of my life for many
years to come.
Last in this group of people I’ve met in graduate school, but certainly not least,
is Kendall Funk. Kendall is quite simply one of the best andmost important people
in my life. She’s exceptional at everything she sets out to do, and she’s wonderful
with everyone she comes into contact with. I’m not sure what my future holds,
but I know it will be better if she is a part of it. I am tremendously indebted to her.
v
Of course, I owe a great deal to a variety of professors. Without Dr. Tom Fuller-
ton at The University of Texas at El Paso, I would not have obtained a masters
degree much less a doctoral degree in any field. Before coming to Texas A&M,
I enjoyed a variety of professional successes and amazing experiences all thanks
to him. He’s still around, and I’m certainly glad that he is. The members of my
dissertation committee have been extremely supportive of me and my research
endeavors, and very generous with their time. I thank Maria Escobar-Lemmon,
Domonic Bearfield, and Francisco Pedraza for partaking in this process and for
their professional support.
Francisco in particular has been an important source of personal support and
encouragement. My friend SergioGarcia once said that I am lucky to be in the same
department as Francisco. Sergio was right, and I am grateful to have Francisco on
my team. Not only is Francisco a colleague, he is also a friend.
And then, of course, there is Ken Meier. There is absolutely no question that
without Ken in my corner as my advisor andmentor, I would not be on the cusp of
becoming Dr. Molina. I’ve had many important experiences with Ken. Of these,
there is one that I will never forget. It was the moment that Ken said something
that made me believe I could find the courage to push through the program. It
occurred at the end of my first semester, the day before I would drive to El Paso for
the Christmas holiday. At that point, everything that I’d experienced sincemoving
to College Station was a tremendous shock.
Convinced that I wouldn’t continue in our program, I met with Ken before
heading home. It was during that meeting that he said to me “ You’re midway
through the first quarter of a four quarter game. This is a game that you’re going
to play. You might not think so right now, but you’re going to finish the game.”
vi
You see, in my opinion that’s when Ken is at his best. When he’s presented with
the opportunity to encourage and lift a student who he cares about. What I respect
the most about him is his willingness to open pathways to success for others, his
ability to create opportunities where there appear to be none, and his willingness
to support his students in any way that he can. Thank you, Ken. Thank you for
everything.
This dissertation – along with anything else that I’ve accomplished up until
now – belongs to my mother, Norma Molina. My mother inspires me every single
day. Without fail, my mother encourages me to be a better person with her guid-
ance, her lessons, and her love. She is without question the strongest person in
my life, stronger than I could ever hope to become. She is accomplished, loved,
admired, and respected by more people than anyone else I know. But most impor-
tantly, she is the only person in my life who has always put me first. Even though
I fail at doing so from time to time, I try never to take her for granted.
Often times, I say to people that the only reason I’ve come so far is that I come
from an amazing family. But what I really mean is that I come from an amazing
mother. As the years pass, she doesn’t slow down. Sometimes I wish that she
would. But then I’m reminded of all the gifts that my mother has to oﬀer, and I
smile. I smile because I know that my mother has given the very best of her to my
sisters and I. The sacrifices that she has made for me, and that she continues to
make, are both countless and invaluable. And so I’ll end my acknowledgements
with what is undoubtedly the most meaningful acknowledgement of all. This dis-
sertation is yet another product of mymother’s tenacity and perseverance, and yet
another product of her love for me. She made it possible for me to write it. Thank
you, Mom. I owe you so much.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Change, Public Organizations, and the Latino Demographic . . . . 1
1.2 Setting the Broader Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 Latinos and the Process of Influence in Public Organizations 4
1.2.2 Population, Ethnic Attachments, and Organizational Lead-
ership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.3 Access: Inside the Bureaucracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. INSTITUTIONS AND LATINOS’ ACCESS TO POLITICAL REPRESEN-
TATION IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 Public Organizations and Their Political Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Election Institutions Latino Representation: Advancing a New Un-
derstanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 At-large and Single-Member School Board Elections . . . . . 15
2.2.2 BreakingNewGround: Accounting for Timing and Partisan-
ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 The Empirical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Discussion of Findings and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3. UNDOCUMENTED LATINOS AND THE POLITICS OF LATINOS’ EX-
POSURE TO PUNITIVE SCHOOLING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1 From a Long-Standing Problem Comes a New Puzzle . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Barriers Confronting Latino Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 Theoretical Expectations: Fitting Undocumented Students Into the
Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4 Empirical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
viii
3.5 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5.1 Latino Student Suspensions and Expulsions . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5.2 Latino Grouping and Graduation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6 Discussion of Findings and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4. STRATEGICREPRESENTATION, LATINOS,ANDEDUCATIONALOUT-
COMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.1 On Performance and Bureaucratic Representation . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2 Representative Bureaucracy: Where the Theory Stands . . . . . . . 64
4.2.1 Searching for Evidence of Bureaucratic Representation . . . 67
4.2.2 Race, Representation, and Performance in Education . . . . 68
4.3 Taking Decision Making Seriously: A Theory of Strategic Represen-
tation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4 The Empirical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.6 Discussion and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 Educating Latinos: Will Demographics Ever Become Destiny? . . . 89
5.2 Moving Existing Literature Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.3 Deriving Sustainable Solutions for an Unsustainable Problem . . . . 93
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
ix
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
2.1 Representation and Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 School Board Representation, Timing, and Partisanship . . . . . . . 31
3.1 Modeling Latino Suspensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Latino Student Expulsions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3 Latino Intellectual Disability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Latino Gifted and Talented Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Latino Diploma Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1 Superintendents in Texas: 1999-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Performance Gap Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 Latino Superintendents and Outcome Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4 Latino Superintendents, Teachers, and Outcome Gaps . . . . . . . . 85
x
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Change, Public Organizations, and the Latino Demographic
In a recent study of population change in the United States, the geographer
Rachel Franklin (2014, 18) noted that “As a whole, the U.S. population is undergo-
ing a significant transition from majority White, non–Hispanic to a majority com-
posed of racial and ethnic minorities.” Today, groups in society that were once
only sparsely present now occupy a much larger and continually growing share of
the population. Understanding the broad implications of this demographic shift is
a critical pursuit for contemporary scholars, and one that may be grounded in nu-
merous theoretical and methodological approaches. Still, many of the challenges
relating to the rise of minority groups unfurl within the context of public policy
and organizations that operate within the sphere of government.
As the demographic face of the United States continues to change, the increase
of racial and ethnic minorities is likely to result in profound impacts on the perfor-
mance of public organizations and the quality of policy outcomes they facilitate.
At the same time, there is much uncertainty regarding the ability of such organi-
zations to enfranchise the interests of groups that continue to shed their status as
numerical minorities. Are the ideal organizational structures in place? Has the
organization hired the best people to implement the best policies? A passive ob-
servation of demographic change oﬀers little insight into these questions and the
mechanisms that determine how public organizations determine the standing of
racial and ethnic minorities within the larger polity. Adding clarity to this impor-
1
tant issue requires a new look beneath the surface of important factors that alter
the interplay between governmental bureaucracies and their minority clientele. ă
While the ramifications of a growing minority clientele for public-sector bu-
reaucracies are not confined to one policy area, they are perhaps the most critical
within the context of education. As the demographic composition of the general
population has shifted, so to have the demographics of our nation’s students, the
key clientele served by public schools throughout the country. Once the largest
group consuming educational services, White students now occupy a progres-
sively smaller presence; the K-12 system now serves a majority-minority body of
students.1 Still, school bureaucracies across the country have struggled with this
change. A wealth of empirical analyses document the often bleak educational cir-
cumstances faced by non-White communities (San Miguel 1983; Fraga, Meier, and
England 1986; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Reyes and Valencia 1993; Hess
and Leal 2001; Kozol 2005).
Of the growing minority population, the Latino demographic has been at the
fore of demographic change both in and out of the classroom. Latinos are now
the largest minority contingent in the United States, and since the year 2000 have
contributed the majority of population growth (Passel, Cohn, and Lopez 2011).
Current projections reveal that by the year 2060 Latinos will eclipse 30 percent of
the general population. 2 The ramifications of their growth for the education sec-
tor are striking. By the year 2050, some anticipate that the majority of America’s
school-age population will be Latino (Fry and Gonzales 2008). Because Latinos
already account for a substantial share of all students enrolled in the K-12 system,
1According to data released by theNationalCenter for Education Statistics Institute of Education
Sciences in their Projections of Education Statistics to 2022, 41st Edition.
2Census projections at www.census.gov/newsroom /releases/archives/population/cb12-
243.html.
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one must answer the following question in order to understand the macro-level
success or failure of our nation’s K-12 education sector: What are the factors that
shape the ability of education organizations tomeet the needs of their Latino clien-
tele?
With this question in mind, the goal of this dissertation is to contribute new
perspectives on how local political and organizational factors impact Latino com-
munities. It is composed of various sections, each with an emphasis on public
school districts – the systems comprised of a governing board and the organiza-
tions they oversee – because they serve as exchanges of political and policy influ-
ence for Latinos. At present, there is little buﬀer between the decisions and actions
ongoing within local schools and an array of political influences (Meier 2002). The
ramifications of the decisions made in these organizational settings reach beyond
the classroom, influencing how the broader community residing within a school
district’s boundaries experiences democracy (Feuerstein 2002).
I argue that Latinos’ standing in public education is a function of local political,
administrative, and organizational factors. These factors are of practical impor-
tance in what Gándara and Contreras (2009) refer to as a Latino education crisis.
This crisis requires a renewed emphasis on the various facets of local school sys-
tems that impact Latinos students. But why? One answer relates to the consider-
able presence that school boardmembers occupy in what can be conceptualized as
Latinos’ broader public-sector influence. In other words, their ability to influence
local organizations and public policies at the local level. The National Associa-
tion of Latino Elected and Appointed Oﬃcials (NALEO) reports that in 2012, well
over one third of all Latino elected oﬃcials in the United States were school board
representatives.
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The figure reported by NALEO reveals that a considerable share of Latinos’
public-sector influence was concentrated within K-12 bureaucracies. Improving
our understanding of how such influence comes to pass, and what it portends for
Latino students, will advance our understanding of place that Latinos occupy in
themost local and frequently encountered form of governance inAmerica’s decen-
tralized democracy. Because the Latino population is also significantly comprised
of individuals with immigrant status (Fraga et al. 2012), the political and orga-
nizational determinants of education outcomes are also important predictors of
Latinos’ broader political and social incorporation.
1.2 Setting the Broader Stage
1.2.1 Latinos and the Process of Influence in Public Organizations
Research has firmly established that Latinos highly value educational oppor-
tunity. As it relates to their attitudes towards various policies, education is among
the policies that Latinos have displayed the most concern for (Fraga et al. 2012).
In their extensive analysis of Latino focus groups, Fraga et al. (2010, 64) find that
“Latinos...indicated that they valued education as a means to facilitate securing
gainful employment and achieving upward mobility in the United States gener-
ally.” The findings are indicative of Latinos’ preferences for pathways to academic
advancement. But why haven’t these preferences been translated into broad aca-
demic success?
Within any organizational setting, the translation of policy-related aspirations
into positive outcomes requires access to positions of organizational influence. In
the context of public education, Meier, Stewart, and England (1989, 12) argue that
“determining overall policy, translating overall policy into administrative rules
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and procedures, and implementing rules and procedures by applying them to in-
dividuals" are the three decision areas that shape policy outcomes. Individually,
the various sections of this dissertation engage diﬀerent dimensions of these vital
decision-making points. Collectively, they tell a story about the process of influ-
ence in school districts, and other public organizations, that determines how bu-
reaucracies serve Latino communities. Focusing on some of the core elements in
this process can help interested parties understand an important source of the dis-
connect between Latinos’ education preferences and their observed education out-
comes. This process begins with ethnic attachments and access to seats on elected
school boards.
1.2.2 Population, Ethnic Attachments, and Organizational Leadership
With the exception of scholars concerned with questions of bureaucratic rep-
resentation, researchers of public organizations generally ignore the significance
of ethnic attachments between public-sector decision makers and private citizens.
Yet, the fact that many service-providing organizations are governed by a publicly
elected board indicates that this omission is problematic. A bureaucracy’s elected
oﬃcials make crucial decisions that sway organizational behavior, suggesting that
the ramifications of shared ethnic identification are not confined to an organiza-
tion’s street-level or managerial tier. In studies that focus on Latinos, onemust rely
on political science scholarship that examines how ethnic identification influences
Latinos’ broader political behavior in order to understand how it can shape the
governance of public organizations.
Ethnic attachments are influential when a Latino runs for a seat on the board
of a public utility, community college, hospital, or any publicly elected board that
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serves Latino communities. These attachments can help explain the relationship
between the demographicmakeup of an organization’s elected board and the char-
acteristics of its clients. According to Barreto (2010), the presence of Latino can-
didates creates an ethnic political context wherein Latino communities exhibit a
greater interest in elections and mobilize in favor of Latino candidates. Indeed,
research finds that shared ethnicity prominently influences Latinos’ mobilization
(Shaw, Garza, and Lee 2000;Michelson 2003) and their support for candidateswith
ethnic ties to the Latino community (for example, in such works as Leighley and
Vedlitz 1999; McConnaughy et al. 2010; Manzano and Sanchez 2010; Barreto 2010;
Schildkraut 2012).
Ethnic connections become particularly salient when the electoral setting in-
volves political activities that bear direct implications for Latino groups (Pantoja,
Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Sanchez 2006). School board decisions are examples of
such activities. Indeed, ethnic attachments are thought to be an important mech-
anism within research that uncovers a strong association between measures of
Latino population size and the presence of Latinos serving on school boards (Leal,
Martinez-Ebers, andMeier 2004; Fraga and Elis 2009;Meier and Stewart 1991). The
first section of this dissertation adds to this remarkably limited body of work by
analyzing new data that cover more time points than many existing studies.
The first section also considers the role that electoral institutions play in deter-
mining who governs organizations. Many of these institutions are the remnants
of Progressive-era reforms that created themodern-day institutional foundation of
local elections in the U.S. (Trounstine 2010). In the realm of public education, Pro-
gressive reforms have had significant impacts on school board elections (Kirst and
Wirt 2009). As Meier (2002, 219) notes , “The structural designs common to most
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U.S. educational systems did not remove education from politics; it only trans-
formed the politics of education, advantaging some interests and disadvantaging
others.” Institutional features of school board elections can impact school district
governance by moderating the extent to which Latinos’ population numbers (and
hence their education preferences) are translated into school board seats.
The diﬀerential eﬀects of at-large and single-member elections have been the
prominent focus of contemporary research onminority representation in local set-
tings. Indeed, my first study examines the role of these, as I investigate the extent
to which population leads to school board seats under either system. The system
of election, although an important determinant of minority access to boards seats
in general, is not the only institutional element of local elections that can aﬀect
Latinos’ access to important decision-making points. Far less is known about the
impact of two prominent institutions: election timing and partisanship. Therefore,
I expand an under-studied area of Latino education by exploring levels of repre-
sentation within districts that hold either November or non-November elections,
and within partisan and nonpartisan school board elections.
1.2.3 Access: Inside the Bureaucracy
This dissertation is also concerned with providing new insights regarding pre-
viously unexamined factors that can impact the quality of Latinos’ educational
outcomes. Once Latinos occupy positions of influence in a school district, there
is an overarching assumption that Latino students will benefit. In other words,
education outcomes are thought to improve in response to diﬀerent levels of rep-
resentation within the organization. Here, perhaps the most basic benefit that or-
ganizational influence generates for minority clientele is the appointment or hir-
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ing of minority administrators, and the hiring of minority bureaucrats (Saltzstein
1989; Eisinger 1982; Kerr et al. 2013). What’s more, many studies highlight the
relationship between the presence of minority personnel and outcomes that align
withminority interests in the context of educational services (see for example Leal,
Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Fraga and Elis 2009).
However, Latinos continue to face a variety of hurdleswhen it comes to improv-
ing policy outcomes. This is the case with the implementation of school policies
that generate a racial imbalance in how diﬀerent groups of students are sanctioned
for similar behaviors (Skiba et al. 2011), most notably Latino students (Stader 2004).
Latino students are also frequently placed into low-ability groups that diminish the
long-term quality of education they receive (Meier and Stewart 1991). Despite the
considerable influx of Latino immigrants in recent years (Passel and Cohn 2011),
analyses that account for the salience of noncitizenship aremissing from the schol-
arly discussion of Latinos and public organizations. The second second presents
a study that attempts to help close this gap in the literature through an analysis of
Latino students and education policies that accounts for undocumented students.
Why is this an important addition to the literature? It is an important addition
given that immigrants of Latino origin are commonly painted as a threat to Amer-
ican institutions (see Huntington 2004b). Given this, conventional wisdom might
suggest that the presence of undocumented students would create an unfavorable
policy environment for Latino students in general. However, systematic analyses
find that many of the popular myths surrounding Latino immigrants are not em-
pirical realities. For example, research now demonstrates that they are less likely
to commit crimes than native-born Americans (Perez 2009).
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Additionally, the tenuous situation of Latino immigrants incentivizes the kind
of productivity and social interactions thatwould eschewunwanted attention from
the media, general public, or law enforcement agencies (Kasinitz et al. 2009). It
stands to reason that undocumented Latino students possess a similar set of in-
centives, based on their unique circumstances. Undocumented Latino students
likely reside in householdswith parents and other familymemberswho share their
undocumented status. For these students, the fear of deportation and separation
from their family is a reality (Arbona et al. 2010). Because of this, undocumented
Latinos hold greater incentives to assimilate and incorporate themselves into their
academic settings. I argue that these unique circumstances are important for un-
derstanding interactions between Latinos students and education bureaucracies.
In the third empirical section, yet another contribution to the research on mi-
norities in public organizations is provided. Here, I depart from existing literature
by providing a new theoretical account of how the performance oriented nature
of public education - and of public organizations more generally - influences the
outcomes of representation that are now anticipated in the presence of minority
public administrators. This new theory is entitled Strategic Representation, and it is
concerned with the actions and decisions of superintendents.
Representative bureaucracy provides the theoretical platform for this portion
ofmy dissertation. In a broad sense, scholarly researchers of public administration
have, for many decades now, sought to shed light on the role of bureaucratic or-
ganizations as democratically representative institutions (Kingsley 1944; Krislov
1974; Selden 1997; Meier 1993b; Wilkins and Williams 2009; Bradbury and Kel-
lough 2011). At the core of representative bureaucracy theory is the notion that
9
when bureaucratic demographics match the demography of policy consumers,
those consuming the policies become passively and actively represented.
Today, a prominent line of research explores the relationship between racial
representation and the performance of educational organizations (Meier 1984;Meier
and Stewart 1991; Pitts 2005, 2007; Roch, Pitts, and Navarro 2010; Roch and Pitts
2012). Although such research carries important practical implications, current
studies fail to consider how performance pressures and pursuit of multiple ob-
jectives can influence this form of representation. I argue that such factors have
important implications for how bureaucracies serve their Latino clients. The the-
ory that I propose in this dissertation’s final empirical section is intended to depict
the ways in which the salience of performance in the course of managerial deci-
sion making can influence how organizations and their administrators represent
minority groups.
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2. INSTITUTIONS AND LATINOS’ ACCESS TO POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS
2.1 Public Organizations and Their Political Puzzle
How do elements of the political process infuse public organizations with the
interests of certain clientele while suppressing the preferences of others? Because
the general public relies on such organizations for the delivery of essential public
services, the implications of this puzzle are sprawling. Across multiple spheres of
public policy, institutional constraints determinewhich clientele gain access to cru-
cial organizational deliberations. The purpose of this study is to analyze how elec-
toral institutions moderate Latinos’ access to positions of political power within
public organizations.
In a broad sense, Latinos and other racial and ethnic minorities have experi-
enced comparatively less access to the policy-making arena. For these groups, in-
stitutional barriers this limit this access are particularly salient. Their demographic
intensity notwithstanding, racial and ethnic minorities continue to grapple with
institutionalized ceilings that constrain their ability to influence politics and pol-
icy (Ramakrishnan 2005). These ceilings are present in public organizations that
are governed by an elected board of representatives. Given the vital role that these
boards occupy in the provision of local goods and services, institutional ceilings
that make them less representative of minority groups may be among the most
detrimental.
While public organizations governed by elected boards provide opportunities
for participation in the policy process, they also provide venues for the insertion
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of racial and ethnic minority preferences, values, and aspirations into the larger
political system. And although such pathways vary, minority representation in
local governance has been instrumental in the creation of policy arenas that en-
franchise a plurality of interests (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Hero 1992;
Wolbrecht and Hero 2005; Harris, Sinclair-Chapman, and McKenzie 2005; Barreto
2007; Marschall and Ruhil 2007; Vernby 2013). This has been particularly crucial in
the context of organizations that serve large Latino communities (Leal, Martinez-
Ebers, and Meier 2004).
Despite the increasing salience of these institutions, only a relative handful of
scholars have attempted to uncover what they portend for Latinos. New insights
are required because of the limited research, but they are also required given recent
legislation. The decision in Shelby County v. Holder (2013) weakened Voting Rights
Act protections against election plans that dilute the political influence of minority
groups. Many jurisdictions responded to this by swiftly proposing election plans
that would limit the ability of minority voters to win locally-elected seats (Tokaji
2014).
Many legal battles – grounded in voting protections – persist over certain as-
pects of local elections in regions that serve large Latino communities. The Califor-
nia Voting Rights (CVRA), signed into law in July of 2002, paved the way for chal-
lenges to the implementation of at-large elections in that state (Leoni and Skinnell
2009). Many of these challenges have significant ramifications for various public
policies. For example, in 2014 California’s San Benito Healthcare District, charged
with the oversight of a major hospital and various subsidiary facilities, faced liti-
gation over its use of at-large elections to select its five-member board 1 In 2007, the
1http://www.sanbenitocountytoday.com
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Tulare Local Healthcare District faced similar litigation over how its board mem-
bers were elected.2 In both cases, these healthcare districts serve largely Latino
communities.
In public education, persistently low levels of Latino representation on school
boards is thought to be the product of institutional biases. The CVRA was cited
in the case of Rios v. ABC Unified School District (2013) filed after Latinos con-
sistently failed to win school board seats in districts with at-large races, despite
comprising considerable numbers in the surrounding community. In the state of
Texas, Rodriguez v. Grand Prairie Independent School District was filed in March
of 2013 to repeal the use of at-large elections not long after Latinos failed to win
school board seats within a district whose student population is majority Latino.
Post-secondary educational boards have also come under scrutiny. At-large elec-
tions were also the cause of a lawsuit filed against the Lone Star College System
who implemented this plan to elect a board tasked with the oversight of its eight
branch campuses.
The timing of local elections also remains a contested issue. In a 2014 case, a
lawsuit was filed against the Tarrant Regional Water District in state of Texas af-
ter its proposed changes in the timing of its board-member elections.3 The timing
of elections continues to shift in response to the preferences of state and local oﬃ-
cials often resulting in oﬀ-cycle contests. However, scheduling of elections at times
other than November was a component of eﬀort to reduce minority representation
(Kirst and Wirt 2009). Although recent work has focused on the larger political
consequences of election timing (Allen and Plank 2005; Berry and Gersen 2011;
Anzia 2014), these analyses deemphasize the implications for the representation
2ear.berkeley.edu
3http://www.fwweekly.com
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of Latinos and other minority groups. Similar to proposed changes to the timing
of elections, nonpartisan systems were initially designed to enfranchise the prefer-
ences of aﬄuent groups (Trounstine 2010). That some local elections remain parti-
san contests suggests that there are consequences for the degree to which Latinos
gain policy representation. This study also explores the impact of this institution.
The broad consequences of election structures for Latinos’ representation in
policy organizations remain uncertain. However, they appear to have a dispropor-
tionate impact on America’s public school districts. While there exists no panacea
for Latinos’ gaps in academic opportunity and achievement, representation on
school boards is a political means of improving how educational organizations
serve Latino communities (Meier and Stewart 1991; Leal andHess 2000; Leal,Martinez-
Ebers, andMeier 2004). For this reason, when the representation of the Latino pop-
ulation in school governance is limited, their prospects for sustainable academic
progress also suﬀers.
The data analyzed in this study are taken from urban school boards during
the decade of the 2000s, a period that can be characterized by the Latino demo-
graphic’s remarkable growth (Passel, Cohn, and Lopez 2011). While it may be
diﬃcult to generalize to all organizations that serve Latinos, the span of school
boards in this analysis encompasses a large percentage of them over the course
of several years. With their share of the US populace continually increasing, Lati-
nos will become increasingly salient to future conceptions of public organization
performance, policy outcomes, and the new roles that historically marginalized
groups play in shaping public-sector outcomes.
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2.2 Election Institutions Latino Representation: Advancing a New
Understanding
2.2.1 At-large and Single-Member School Board Elections
According to the National League of Cities, at-large elections are implemented
by approximately 64 percent of all USmunicipalities. Compared to single-member
(or ward) systems, candidates in at-large elections must appeal to a larger voting
base in order towin an election. In contrast, in single-member elections, candidates
can focus their eﬀorts on voters who are divided into individual districts constitut-
ing the geographic area that ultimately they would represent (Bedolla 2012). Yet,
commenting on the political consequences of each system, Shah (2010, 86) notes
that
“Electoral structure is purported to influence the probability of repre-
sentation because of two persistent factors: (a) most U.S. cities are seg-
regated spaces and (b) non-Whites tend to be a minority within juris-
diction. At-large systems thus create an additional burden for minority
candidates: Minority candidates must secure not only their constituen-
cys support but also engender substantial cross-over voting from non-
minority voters.”
To date, most analyses of the relationship between at-large elections and mi-
nority representation focus on African American communities (for example in
works such as Davidson and Korbel 1981; Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Welch
1990; Polinard et al. 1994; Trounstine and Valdini 2008). While the majority of this
work finds that at-large systems yield lower levels of representation than single-
member systems (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Karnig and Welch 1982; Troun-
stine and Valdini 2008; Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah 2010), the recent work of Meier
and Rutherford (2014) challenges this perspective. In that study, African Ameri-
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cans appear to have surmounted some of the biases inherent in at-large elections.
According to Meier and Rutherford (2014), African American communities are
now overrepresented within many at-large systems, particularly on school boards
in regions with strongly Democratic constituencies.
For Latinos, population size is the strongest predictor of their representation
on locally elected boards (Fraga and Elis 2009). Unlike the recent work on African
Americans, however, Latinos are underrepresented by both at-large and single-
member systems (Fraga, Meier, and England 1986; Meier and Stewart 1991; Leal,
Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Meier et al. 2005; Reyes and Neiman 2011). Lev-
els of representation are at their lowest, however, when at-large systems are imple-
mented in areas with a non-Latino voting majority (Meier and Stewart 1991).
Within the current study, I anticipate a positive relationship between Latino
group size and the percentage of board seats that are held by Latino representa-
tives. While this expectation may not be surprising, it is important to consider
its underlying mechanism. Latino communities have preferences for Latino can-
didates due to deep ethnic connections (Barreto 2010), and the assumption that
Latino public oﬃcials will advance a policy agenda that institutionalizes the pref-
erences of Latino communities. However, the strength of the connection between
population and seats depends on the election plan in place, and whether Lati-
nos constitute a majority of the population. In districts where Latinos comprise
a numerical majority of the surrounding population, single-member and at-large
election systems are likely to exert similar eﬀects on representation. When Latinos
constitute less than half of the surroundingpopulation, the election system in place
eﬀectively determines the eﬃciency with which Latino population strength trans-
lates into strength in representation. In this case, Latinos comprise a numerical
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minority, the greatest degree of school board representation should be observed
in districts that implement single-member elections.
2.2.2 Breaking New Ground: Accounting for Timing and Partisanship
In addition to reconsidering howdiﬀerent election systems shape Latinos’ pres-
ence on school boards, this study also aims to provide theoretically justifiable ex-
pectations regarding the impact of diﬀerent election schedules. For this, recent
studies of how diﬀerent election schedules impact voter turnout provide a useful
starting point. Although the focus of this analysis is not on group turnout per se,
for Latino population size to translate into elected seats, Latinos must turnout to
vote. The nascent work on the connections between election timing and turnout
is, therefore, important for the current eﬀort.
It is important to note that citizens participate in school board elections far less
then than they do in other elections (Allen and Plank 2005). While some of this
low participation may be traced to comparatively low interest in locally elected
boards, much of it might also be linked to the costs of participating in elections
with institutional arrangements that inflate participation costs. Since the work of
(Downs 1957), it has been well established that the decision to participate in any
election implies a willingness to absorb the related costs. Timing matters in this
regard since elections scheduled at diﬀerent times produce unequal costs (Anzia
2014). When elections for local oﬃces are consolidated with state and federal elec-
tions, voters are providedwith a greater flow of information regarding the various
candidates. This minimizes the costs of acquiring information, and increases the
likelihood that at least one of the contests will motivate voters to go to the polls
(Lijphart 1997).
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Although turnout in school board elections tends to be greater when elections
are held in November, most school board elections are not November aﬀairs (Hess
2002). In a study of Michigan school board elections, Allen and Plank (2005) find
that the media coverage of elections, including coverage of school candidates and
their policy platforms, was greater in cities with consolidated elections. Allen and
Plank (2005) argue that holding school district elections concurrently with other
elections increased the flow of political information to the communities in their
sample, which was critical in motivating turnout. Similarly, the study by Hajnal
and Lewis (2003) conclude that timing is among the most crucial predictors of
participation on local elections. Using data from California local elections, Hajnal
and Lewis (2003) find that voter turnout in municipalities that held their elections
in tandem with general elections sharply outpaced turnout in municipalities with
oﬀ-cycle election schedules.
Recent studies also find that oﬀ-cycle elections institutionalize the preferences
of politically powerful groups by eﬀectively determining the composition of the
electorate that turns out in the first place (Meredith 2009; Berry and Gersen 2010,
2011; Anzia 2011). Because they are thought to have more at stake in the outcomes
of local elections, turnout rates for organized interest groups such as teachers and
other public employees tend to be higher than median turnout (Anzia 2011). As
the costs of participation increase in oﬀ-cycle contests, voters with the most in-
vested in the electoral outcome become themost willing to absorb the rising voting
costs, thus increasing the odds that their preferred candidate will win the election
(Berry and Gersen 2010; Anzia 2014).
For Latino representation on school boards, the timing of elections could result
in two distinct patterns. First, November elections might lead to high-information
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environments that provide Latino communities with greater information concern-
ing the various political candidates, including any Latinos who are on the ballot.
Under this scenario, November elections would bolster the proportion of Latino-
held seats. This logic suggests that in comparison to districts that conduct oﬀ-cycle
elections, representation would be higher in districts with November elections. At
the same time, however, November elections have the potential to increase the par-
ticipation of other racial and ethnic groups, or groupswith a greatermaterial stake
school board outcomes. For that reason, if the Latino population/seats relation-
ship is stronger in November districts, this would imply that the increase in Latino
participation outpaces the increased participation of others groups.
Still, an additional factor must be accounted for. November elections imply
longer ballots, and longer ballots increase the chances that roll-oﬀ (or voter fatigue)
will occur. In a recent study of voter fatigue in November concurrent elections,
Lott Jr. (2009) finds that Latino voters displayed higher patterns of roll-oﬀ than
other voter groups. If indeed it is the case that Latino voters are less likely to cast
votes for down-ballot contests in on-cycle elections (such as school board seats),
then political representation in school districts with November elections would
be lower. Here, non-November elections would result result in more Latino-held
seats.
The partisan dimension of school board elections is the third institutional fea-
ture of this study. Similar to the push for oﬀ-cycle elections, Progressive reformers
believed that local governments and bureaucracieswould functionmore eﬃciently
in the absence of partisan influences (Trounstine 2010). By removing party labels
from school district elections, reformers also sought to eliminate the corrupt and
ineﬃcient use of resources that had been designated solely for educational pur-
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poses (Kirst and Wirt 2009). Yet, the removal of party politics from local elections
has had significant consequences for democratic accountability of local govern-
ments, including many urban school systems. In nonpartisan elections, the two
major parties become less likely to support the campaign and mobilization eﬀorts
of candidates on the ballot, creating a scenario that disadvantages candidates from
groups with low levels of socioeconomic influence, such as racial and ethnic mi-
norities (Davidson and Fraga 1988).
In nonpartisan elections, one also observes an absence of political cues that con-
stituents would otherwise rely upon (Karnig and Walter 1983; Hajnal and Lewis
2003; Wood 2002; Caren 2007). This has contributed to lower levels of political
engagement and participation in local elections (Hajnal and Lewis 2003). If non-
partisan systems bring with them a decrease in political resources (such as voter
information and campaign resources), school districts that conduct their elections
without formal ties to either major political party might also have a comparatively
smaller proportion of Latinos on their district’s board. If the absence of important
political cues that Latinos rely on dampens participation, then the link between
Latino group size and representation would likely be weaker in nonpartisan dis-
tricts than districts whose representatives with formal party ties.
2.3 The Empirical Setting
Within previous studies of minority representation at the local level, the major-
ity of statistical analyses are cross-sectional in their approach. This is a potentially
important limitation given the political landscape that encompasses the broader
Latino demographic, the increase and spread of Latino populations throughout
the United States, and the additional element of citizen status. Observations over
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multiple years would allow for a more expansive coverage of such factors. Relying
on several sources, the current study analyzes several years of figures measured
at the school-district level. Demographic and socioeconomic indicators are taken
from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census school district data files. These files provide
information on the size of the Latino population, the citizenship of the Latino pop-
ulation and a variety of potentially meaningful socioeconomic resources (Latino
high school graduates, the Latino/White income ratio, and the White poverty
rate).
Original surveys provide the data for Latino representation on school boards,
along with data regarding the structure of public school board elections. Con-
ducted in 2001, 2004, and 2008, these surveys oﬀer potentially expansive insights.
All public school districts in the U.S. with student populations that exceeded 5,000
as of 1999 are included in this survey. The total number of district years in the
panel is 5,493, and, of these, 5,192 provided answers generating a 94.5 percent re-
sponse rate. It is important to highlight that these districts contain over 95% of the
Latino population in theUnited States. Due tomissing observations for the various
independent variables, the number of cases included in each model specification
varies.
The dependent variable is the percentage of school board seats held by Latino
oﬃcials. In examining the relationship betweenpopulation and school board seats,
twomeasures of Latino population at the school district level are utilized. The first
measure is the percentage of local (school district level) population that, accord-
ing to Census estimates, is classified as Latino. Previous studies have taken simi-
lar approaches in analyzing the population/representation relationship on school
boards, though their use of a static measure of Latino population fails to account
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for changing population levels. The use of a static population measure would also
inadequately capture the association between population and school politics over
time given the rapidly growing Latino population. To improve upon the now stan-
dard approach, in this studyCensus data are used to create an adjusted population
measure that accounts for Latino population growth between the years 2000 and
2010 in this sample. In addition to this, a similar metric of the Latino population
whot are noncitizens, in percentage terms, is utilized.
Although I am primarily concerned with how various election institutions de-
termine the extent of Latino representation on school boards previous studies point
to the importance of African Americans (Rocha 2007) and liberal Whites (Brown-
ing, Marshall, and Tabb 1984) as allies in the political process. Two indicators are
used to account for the potentially important influence of political allies in local
elections. First, the percentage of African American population in the district is
included in the fully specified models. The second indicator is the measure of
Democratic voting taken from the online replication data for theMeier and Ruther-
ford (2014) analysis.
Furthermore, groups require the material resources needed to influence the
political process. In previous studies of school board representation, Latinos’ ed-
ucation levels and financial resources (relative to White resources) have proven to
be important predictors (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, andMeier 2004). Similar indicators
will be included in this analysis.
As noted in the previous sections, several measures of Latino community re-
sources are also incorporated. These include a metric of Latino human capital and
relative economic status (the ratio of Latino/White income). Related studies ac-
count for the possibility that white voters view middle-class minority candidates
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more favorably than white candidates with lower-class backgrounds (for example
in Rocha 2007). The models in this analysis account for this possibility by includ-
ing the percentage of Whites living below the poverty line. As an additional pre-
caution, a set of dichotomous year dummy variables in each model. Each model
was estimated using ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors
clustered by school districts.
2.4 Empirical Results
Before focusing on the institutions of interest, this analysis investigates the di-
rect political impact of population size. At the local level, Latinos’ population size
has to date been the most important predictor of how much representation they
receive. In the absence of high numbers in the surrounding community, onemight
not expect to observe any Latinos on the local school board. Given this, it is im-
portant to establish a connection between group size and seats within the current
sample before analyzing how this connection is shaped by institutional factors.
Looking to Table 2.1, one observes a significant relationship linking school
board representation to Latinos’ population size in the initial model. Here, Lati-
nos gain approximately .70 percentage points in representation for each percent-
age point increase in population. While this could indicate that Latinos experience
70 percent of the representation their population numbers call for, one must take
into the threshold that is present. In this case, a negative and significant intercept
indicates that Latinos receive no representation at all until they comprise approx-
imately 6 percent of the population.
However, the first model groups together Latino minority and Latino majority
jurisdictions. To understand the diﬀerences between the two, the second model in
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Table 2.1 includes a dummy variable for school districts where Latinos are a ma-
jority of the local population, along with the interaction of this indicator with the
Latino population. This second model can be decomposed into a simple equation
for districts where Latinos comprise less than 50 percent of the population, and
those where they are the majority. To be clear, in districts where Latinos hold less
than half of the population, the dummy indicator for majority and the interaction
term are equal to zero, resulting in the following seats equation:
Minority Districts Seats = -1.357 + .399 Population
This equation reveals that when Latinos comprise less than half of the popu-
lation, just 40 percent of the school board representation population calls for is
created. This is subject to a modest threshold eﬀect of 3.4 percent of population.
When they are a majority, majority equations can be derived by combining the
various slope coeﬃcients as follows:
Majority Districts Seats = (-1.357 - 66.070) + (.399 + 1.276) Population
= -67.43 + 1.675 (Population)
The third model in Table 2.1 includes the measure of Latino noncitizenship.
Here, the anticipated negative result is observed, indicating that as the percent-
age of noncitizens increases, Latinos receive less representation on their school’s
elected board. Interestingly, the addition of this variable also reduces the equation
intercept to zero. This suggests that the population threshold present in the local
electoral process can be a function of citizenship, as opposed to an actual threshold
that limits representation below a certain level of population.
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The final model in Table 2.1 begins to examine the role of the various election
systems. In order to determine how the diﬀerent election plans matter, a tech-
nique similar to the method most recently applied in Meier and Rutherford (2014)
is used. In this approach, a dummy variable representing a particular election sys-
tem is interacted with an indicator of minority population size. Drawing from the
survey response data, election-system indicators, that measure the proportion of
school board members elected under ward elections and the proportion that are
appointed by a governing entity such as amayor or other city board, are calculated.
These indicators are then interacted with the Latino population measure. Con-
ducting the analysis in this manner allows for the retention of all cases. It also sug-
gests that the interpretation of how the various structures impact representation
must be conducted in terms of pure at-large, ward, and appointive systems. Also
included in this model are the various control variables for community resources
discussed earlier in this study.
From this fully specified equation, one can see that at-large election plans im-
pose significant limits on representation in areas where Latinos comprise less than
50 percent of the population. Although the population coeﬃcient alone indicates
a strong and positive eﬀect of group size on the percentage of school board seats
held by Latinos, the intercept for this coeﬃcient is significant and negative. What’s
more, its size suggests that Latinos are largely underrepresented when they are a
minority of their school district’s surrounding population. From this model, the
following equations for ward and at-large elections from can be calculated:
Representation in At-Large Districts = -4.14 + .39 Latino population
Representation in Ward Districts = (-4.14 + .130) + (.392 + .084)
25
= -4.01 + .48 Latino Population
In comparison to the at-large relationship, ward election systems oﬀer a slightly
diﬀerent picture of representation. The ward interaction term is positive and sig-
nificant, which reveals that Latinos experience higher levels of representation in
districts that utilize this plan. Here, a one percentage point increase in the Latino
population translates into a .48 percentage increase in representation, compared
to .39 in at-large districts.
Previous research finds that appointee systems, relative to the two other sys-
tems in this analysis, lead to the highest levels of expected representation (Meier
and Stewart 1991; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004). Here, the results indi-
cate that there is no significant between appointed and the other election systems.
Concerning the control variables in the model, only two appear to matter: White
poverty and Democratic partisanship. The positive relationship for White poverty
is consistentwith the literature that contends Latino representation is greaterwhen
the social distance between Latinos andWhites is lower (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and
Meier 2004). For the Democratic variable, the coeﬃcient suggests that Latinos ex-
perience gains in representation in districts with a liberal electorate.
The election system in place is not the only institution that can influence Lati-
nos’ representation on school boards. Election timing and partisan (or nonparti-
san) elections might also aﬀect representation since both are associated with lower
levels of turnout. In order to test how these institutional elements of school board
elections shape representation in this study, models containing all the control vari-
ables in this analysis, omitting the appointed variables, are estimated for the fol-
lowing: districts with November elections, districts with elections held during an-
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Table 2.1: Representation and Population
Latino Majority Latino Socioeconomic
Population Districts Noncitizenship Controls
Intercept -3.953 -1.357 0.106 -4.137
(0.264) (0.196) (0.279) (1.372)
Latino Population 0.696 0.399 0.410 0.392
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.032)
Majority Districts -66.07 -65.20 -62.15
(6.673) (6.620) (6.950)
Majority x Population 1.276 1.257 1.220
(0.096) (0.095) (0.101)
Latino Noncitizens -0.066 -0.059
(0.010) (0.010)
Ward Elections 0.130
(0.351)
Ward x Latino Population 0.084
(0.037)
Appointed Systems 1.072
(0.794)
Appointed x Latino Population 0.084
(0.084)
Democratic Percentage 0.052
(0.017)
Black Population 0.010
(0.011)
White Poverty 0.123
(0.040)
Latino High School Graduates 0.011
(0.011)
Latino/White Income Ratio -0.196
(0.312)
N 5,092 5,092 5,092 4,897
R squared 0.63 0.73 0.73 0.75
F 245.5 345.2 294.9 129.6
Standard errors in parentheses
Year dummy variables not reported
 p< :10,  p< :05,  p< :01
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other month, districts with partisan elections, and those that select board candi-
dates in nonpartisan systems.
When considering these other electoral elements, one needs to be cognizant
of both the changes in the size of the population to representation coeﬃcient and
the changes in the intercepts. A negative intercept indicates all other things being
equal, Latinosmust overcome a population threshold before their group size trans-
lated into school board seats gained. At the outset of this analysis that threshold
was found to be 6 percent. In the fully specified equation reported Table 2.2, with-
out accounting for timing and partisan school board races, the threshold nearly
doubles in size to 11.55 percent in at-large elections. Clearly, this lowers the ex-
pected level of representation that would be observed in areas with lower concen-
trations of Latinos.
Beginning with the time of year in which elections are held, the impact of ward
elections is generally insignificant except in the case of elections not held inNovem-
ber. The reduced equations for November election districts generate the following
relationships:
Representation in At-Large Districts = -2.78 + .36 Latino Population
Representation in Ward Districts = (-2.78 + .151) + (.02+.36)
= -2.63 + .38 Latino Population
The following equation applies to districts with non-November elections:
Representation in At-Large Districts = -7.07 + .46 Latino Population
Representation in Ward Districts = (-7.07 + .48) + (.09+.46)
= -6.59 + .55 Latino Population
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Several aspects of these equations should be noted. First, in November elec-
tions, the choice of electoral structure matters little, and Latinos are substantially
underrepresented. Second, while it appears that non-November elections gen-
erate higher representation coeﬃcients for Latinos (.46 and .55 compared to .36
and .38), at low levels of population this is countered by more negative intercept
terms (approximately 7 percent in months other than November versus 2 percent
in November). Comparing the two suggests that if all other variables are zero,
the threshold eﬀects in November are 7.6 percent Latino population in at-large
elections and 6.9 percent in single member districts; these respective thresholds
are 15.4 percent and 12.0 percent in elections held in other months. Here, a com-
parison also indicates that Latinos are marginally better-oﬀ as a result of at-large
elections held in November, until their population exceeds 44.2 percent. Still, the
diﬀerences are very minor. For Latinos in single member district systems, they do
better in November elections, until they have 23.8 percent of the population.
To clarify this finding, expected representation levels at diﬀerent population
percentages can be calculated. At 30 percent of the population, Latinos would
occupy just over 8.1 percent of school board seats in districts that hold at-large
elections in November. In contrast, the same population percentage would yield
6.7 percent of school board seats in those same districts in other months. For dis-
tricts holding their elections in the traditional non-November time period, 3 per-
cent Latino population predicts 8.1 percent representation in at-large systems, and
9.9 percent representation in single member districts.
Two other relationshipsmerit note in the discussion of electoral timing, citizen-
ship, andpartisanship. The noncitizenship percentage has a larger negative impact
when elections are not held inNovember. The higher level of turnout inNovember
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could suggest that impact of Latino group size faces upper limits as the result of
citizenship that become more crucial in these situations. In addition, the impact
of Democratic partisanship is 46 percent greater in non-November elections.
In Table 2.2, the final two specifications assess the diﬀerent eﬀects of partisan
and nonpartisan elections. The expectations of this institution’s eﬀect are based on
the importance of political cues to participation in local elections. When these cues
are removed, it is anticipated that lower levels of representation will result. The
results reported in Table 2.2 indicate the following for partisan election systems:
Representation in At-Large Districts = -5.48 + .35 Latino Population
Representation in Ward Districts = (-5.48 + -.78) + (.35+.20)
= -6.2+ .55 Latino Population
In nonpartisan elections, the following relationships are observed:
Representation in At-Large Districts = -3.79 + .40 Latino Population
Representation in Ward Districts = (-3.79 + .26) + (.40 + .06)
= -3.53 + .46 Latino Population
The findings illustrate thatwhether or not elections are partisan, singlemember
districts always generate a higher level of Latino representation. In both cases the
population/ward interaction is significant, and it actually triples in size in partisan
systems. The intercept changes are not significant, so the change in slopes is the
determining factor in representation. In sum, single member districts produce
better Latino representation whether the elections are partisan or not. At the same
time, partisan elections can enhance the pro-Latino impacts of a single member
district system, but they have a slight negative impact in an at-large system.
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Table 2.2: School Board Representation, Timing, and Partisanship
November Non-November Partisan Non-Partisan
Elections Elections Elections Elections
Intercept -2.778 -7.074 -5.481 -3.793
(1.625) (2.379) (3.846) (1.514)
Latino Population 0.363 0.460 0.352 0.402
(0.041) (0.052) (0.105) (0.034)
Majority Districts -56.14 -66.20 -94.40 -60.04
(8.957) (10.69) (15.43) (7.342)
Majority x Population 1.155 1.223 1.636 1.185
(0.135) (0.149) (0.245) (0.106)
Latino Noncitizens -0.041 -0.073 -0.049 -0.064
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012)
Ward Elections 0.151 0.476 -0.782 0.260
(0.483) (0.519) (0.595) (0.402)
Ward x Latino Population 0.020 0.090 0.195 0.066
(0.051) (0.049) (0.104) (0.040)
Democratic Percentage 0.050 0.073 0.052 0.056
(0.024) (0.025) (0.036) (0.019)
Black Population 0.023 -0.014 0.010 0.011
(0.018) (0.014) (0.023) (0.012)
White Poverty 0.031 0.255 0.244 0.115
(0.056) (0.059) (0.107) (0.045)
Latino High School Graduates -0.001 0.027 0.028 0.006
(0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.013)
Latino/White Income Ratio -0.192 -0.314 -0.029 -0.255
(0.497) (0.347) (0.350) (0.366)
N 2,581 2,146 631 4,096
R squared 0.66 0.84 0.84 0.74
F 62.27 114.0 39.70 136.1
Standard errors in parentheses
Year Dummy Variables Not Reported
 p< :10,  p< :05,  p< :01
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2.5 Discussion of Findings and Implications
Although their community interactions may be rare, school board represen-
tatives are charged with translating community interests into policy (Allen and
Plank 2005). This study analyzed the relationship between various electoral in-
stitutions and Latinos’ voice on elected school boards. A wealth of studies high-
lights the connection between the Latino demographic and the election of Latino
oﬃcials in a variety of political settings. This includes a sparse body of work in an
education policy context that underscores the connections between Latinos’ grow-
ing demographic presence and the number of Latinos that serve as school board
representatives (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Fraga and Elis 2009).
While previous studies find that while Latino population size is a key predictor
of whether Latinos occupy school board seats, Latinosmust first surpass a popula-
tion threshold before they can formally enter this policy-making arena. The results
of the empirical analyses in this study are consistent with this. When Latinos com-
prise a majority of the population within a school district’s geography, the level of
representation in the current sample increases markedly. Although this finding
may not be particularly surprising, it should not be understated. The significance
of population size in the current study underscores the important relationship be-
tween population strength and political influence, a relationship that has been,
and is likely to remain, at the center of the broader narrative concerning Latinos
and their place within the broader political system.
At the same time, this study also highlight the inescapable reality that popu-
lation size alone is no guarantee of influence. This study supports the notion that
certain political institutions play an important role in shapingLatinos’ access to key
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positions of organizational influence. Although the findings of other studies are
somewhat divided in their assessment of electoral structures and their various im-
pacts on the election of Latino school board candidates, they have generally found
that at-large elections are detrimental to the representation of Latinos. In this vein,
the percentage of school board seats held by Latinos is higher under ward systems
in the districts studied within the current eﬀort. While this study also lends sup-
port to the notion that both at-large and single-member school board elections are
associated with the underrepresentation of Latinos, it finds that other institutions
matter as well.
To be sure, underrepresentation is less problematic within single-member sys-
tems when Latinos are a minority of the local population. As noted early in this
study, there is now evidence that the biases inherent in at-large systemsmay be less
pronounced in African American communities than previously thought (Meier
and Rutherford 2014), as they now find themselves overrepresented in certain ju-
risdictions. For the Latino community, however, this is far from the case. Neither
at-large or district-based elections in the current study can be associated with in-
stances in which Latinos gain a percentage of seats that outstrips their share of the
local population; Latinos are always underrepresented in this study.
Despite early reforms intended to separate politics from governmental organi-
zations, school districts and their elections remain among the politicized arenas in
the United States. One of these reforms was the implementation of nonpartisan
elections. Based on this study, however, the partisan dimension that appears to
have the greatest eﬀect on representation is the partisan voting patterns of the lo-
cal electorate. Although this important factmaybe generally underappreciated, re-
searchers note that American school boards represent the largest number of locally
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elected governments in the United States, and the politics of American school dis-
tricts determine the distribution of policy benefits and burdens to students (Leal,
Martinez-Ebers, andMeier 2004). This section of my dissertationmakes important
additions to current studies by demonstrating that the timing of school board elec-
tions has implications for how much representation Latinos receive, in particular
through its eﬀect on the population threshold that the Latino demographic must
surpass before they become represented.
Research finds that once elected, Latino school board members increase bud-
getary support for programs that benefit Latino students, favor the hiring of more
Latino administrators, which in turn bolsters Latino teacher hiring (Leal and Hess
2000; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004). Such policy environments have the
potential to vastly improve the political conditions encompassing Latino students,
while at the same time providing an important foundation for the social, political,
and economic integration of the larger Latino demographic. At the same time, the
results of this study underscore the role played by local institutions in determin-
ing the strength of such a foundation. If institutions suppress Latinos’ place on
the elected boards of schools and other public organizations, they may also place
significant downward pressure on the ability of Latinos to influence other areas of
governance.
The results of this study also underscore the association between Latino repre-
sentation and Latino noncitizens. A now general expectation is that in areas with
high numbers of Latinos who lack US citizenship, the formal influence of Latinos
is limited. Yet, in the context of education and other policy arenas, the number
of noncitizen Latinos consuming services has likely risen substantially in recent
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years. Today, many noncitizen Latinos are also enrolled in and are the product of
America’s public schools.
The inability of noncitizen Latinos to cast votes and formally influence the out-
comes of school board elections should not result in the exclusion of their needs
from a district’s policy agenda, particularly in regions of the country that are im-
migrant destinations. This includes regions of the US where various immigration,
economic, and social incentives have led to the rise of newly established Latino
communities. Assuming that an organization’s elected leadership is concerned
with improving the quality of outcomes facilitated by their managerial and bu-
reaucratic personnel, decisions that disenfranchise a growing clientele would have
dire consequences for performance.
Latino communities regard educational opportunities as fundamental in their
pursuit of social and economic progress (Fraga et al. 2010). Understanding the
political mechanisms that shape Latinos’ standing in this critical policy domain
remains an important agenda ripe for further research. One important question
for future studies to consider is whether the political dynamics of regions where
new Latino populations are appearing diﬀer from those where Latinos occupy a
strong historical presence. Addressing this question will further the current un-
derstanding of the role played by school districts and other local organizations in
constructing Latinos’ position in the polity.
Furthermore, as more data become available, scholars should address whether
the results of this analysis persist over a longer time period. Such analyses will be
required in order to ascertain whether Latinos and other minority groups are able
to overcomemany of the institutional barriers they currently face. While this study
adds new evidence to a critical arena of politics and policy, school board elections
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are but one piece of a larger puzzle facing Latino communities. In the future, the
outcomes of these and other local elections will determine whether or not public
policies meet the needs of this growing demographic.
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3. UNDOCUMENTED LATINOS AND THE POLITICS OF LATINOS’
EXPOSURE TO PUNITIVE SCHOOLING
3.1 From a Long-Standing Problem Comes a New Puzzle
Within many host countries, the influx of undocumented immigrants contin-
ues to give rise to important policy debates(Freeman 1995; Simon and Lynch 1999;
Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014). Perhaps the
most visible of these debates are the often contentious discussions that surround
U.S. policies that impact immigrant and immigrant proximate groups. Of the
nearly 11 million undocumented immigrants in the US, recent estimates indicate
that the majority are of Latino origin (Passel and Cohn 2011). Indeed, one the
most salient characteristics of today’s Latino population is the presence of undoc-
umented Latinos.
It is not surprising then that much of the extant debate over undocumented
immigrants centers on the Latino demographic, fueled by disputes over policies
such as Arizona’s S.B. 1070, Deferred Action of Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and
the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. At its
core, the larger discourse over the presence of undocumented immigrants may be
characterized as a debate over the interactions between key arms of the bureau-
cratic state and groups who are perceived as illegitimate clientele, threatening to
siphon oﬀ quality and quantity of public services reserved for bureaucracy’s legit-
imate consumers.
The scholarly discourse on the undocumented and the provision of public goods
is alive and well, as scholars from various disciplines have displayed a keen inter-
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est in adding clarity to an increasingly salient, yet often murky, question of public
policy. As an illustration, economists have concerned themselves with what the
presence of undocumented Latinos in the labor force portends for the earnings
of other labor market participants (Bean, Lowell, and Taylor 1988; Rivera-Batiz
1999). In public health, scholars have begun to analyze patterns of healthcare con-
sumption that occurwithin communitieswhere undocumented immigrants reside
(Berk et al. 2000). And, more recently, criminologists have explored the associa-
tion between undocumented immigrants and the incidence of various crimes in
immigrant-host communities (Lee and Martinez 2009).
The provision of educational services by school bureaucracies that serve Latino
immigrant groups has also received growing attention (Green 2003; Abrego 2006;
Nuñez 2013; Jeﬀeries 2014). Still, an issue that has gone largely unexamined is
the relationship between undocumented Latino students and the policy outcomes
of all Latino students, their citizenship status notwithstanding. This omission is
most alarming in the context of policies that have been demonstrated to place un-
due burdens on Latinos in public schools. As prominently implemented policies,
grouping and disciplining represent two long-established forms of educational in-
equity in Latino communities.
Almost without fail, Latinos are disciplined and assigned to low-ability groups
at clips greater than those reported for non-Latino students (Meier and Stewart
1991; Gregory, Skiba, and Noguera 2010; Skiba et al. 2011). As a consequence,
many Latino students are also prevented from experiencing educational services
and programs alongside students from other racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
backgrounds. This is in spite of the significant upward eﬀects that diverse learning
environments have on various forms of student achievement (Hallinan 1998).
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Todate, undocumentedLatino students and the policy-related biases confronted
by Latinos in U.S. public schools have been treated largely as two distinct issues.
In an attempt to connect the two, in this study I engage a new puzzle by analyzing
the relationship between the presence of undocumented Latino students and two
types of punitive school policies - grouping and disciplining - that are applied to
all Latino students within the same school district. From the outset, it should be
well noted that the current eﬀort is not an analysis of how undocumented Latino
students directly aﬀect their documented, or U.S. citizen, Latino peers. It is, how-
ever, an investigation of the following broader question: How does the manner
in which school bureaucracies engage Latino students change when a portion of
those Latino students are undocumented?
The central question addressed in this portion of the dissertation engages a crit-
ical dimension of bureaucracy-Latino interactions in education. Disciplinary sanc-
tions, meted out under adverse circumstances, represent a punitive form of such
interactions. However, in addition to formal disciplinary policies, the placement
of Latinos in low-ability groups can also bear punitive outcomes because it dis-
tances Latino students from quality learning opportunities and rigorous instruc-
tion, much in the same way that separation through formal punishment would.
In order to understand how undocumented Latinos factor into this larger sce-
nario, this study argues that the circumstances surrounding undocumented stu-
dents instill in them a unique set of incentives. These incentives are, for key rea-
sons, distinct from the incentives held by students whose citizenship status is not
in question. Accounting for such incentives allowsme to develop and test hypothe-
ses about the association between undocumented Latino students and the school
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district environment that encompasses all Latino students, the documented and
undocumented included.
The data for the current study are taken from public school districts in Texas,
a state where Latinos occupy a significant contemporary presence and are now
the majority of all students enrolled in public schools. I utilize a novel measure
of Texas’ undocumented Latino students advanced by (Hill and Hawes 2011). In
what follows, I discuss several strands of relevant literature along with my theo-
retical and quantitative analysis. After presenting the empirical findings, I engage
the ramifications of my results for the Latino-bureaucracy relationship in educa-
tion and contact with another critical set of public organizations.
3.2 Barriers Confronting Latino Students
Policies that have exertedpronounced eﬀects on the interactions between school
bureaucracies and their Latino clients are an important dimension of this study.
Regardless of citizenship, the contemporary place of Latino students as an under-
served segment of policy consumers is a function of previous attempts to reform
the relationship between schools and students, making it useful to consider some
of these. In general, Latinos did not experience the early political and social gains
that AfricanAmerican communities experienced owing to the Civil Rights Act and
related litigation over the provision of education services (Acuña 1988). Even after
the passage of federal legislation aimed at equalizing pathways to quality edu-
cation for students of color, Latinos’ claims to equitable education were seen as
illegitimate, and the early political gains that eluded the Latino demographic also
left Latino students on unequal footing (Acuña 1988).
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Latinoswere also separated from the benefits of the SupremeCourt’s 1954 land-
mark decision Brown v. Board of Education that rendered unconstitutional Plessy
v Ferguson’s separate but equal standard (Meier and Stewart 1991; Guajardo and
Guajardo 2004). Although legally classified as White during this time, Latino stu-
dents were not treated as such in the classroom (Donato and Hanson 2012). More-
over, many Latino communities did not perceive school segregation, discrimina-
tion, and substandard instruction to be the products of structural biases against
them, and, as a result, did not mobilize against such barriers (San Miguel 1983).
Thus, despite Brown, separate classrooms for Latinos – almost exclusively of Mexi-
can origin – were a reality in Texas and California until the mid-twentieth century
(San Miguel 1982). It was not until 1975 in the case of Keyes v. Denver that the
U.S. Supreme Court for the first time acknowledged that Latino students faced the
same educational discrimination as African Americans (Meier and Stewart 1991).
While policies such as the DREAMAct have fueled recent debates over undoc-
umented students and their access to public education, these debates are not new.
During the decade of 1970s, Latinos’ immigration status and public education ac-
cess were highly contested in the state of Texas (Rincon 2010). The ensuing eﬀorts
to exclude immigrants from classrooms eventually led to the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing Plyler v. Doe in 1982, ensuring that undocumented immigrant students gained
cost-free educational services in public schools (Green 2003). As Rincon (2010, 12)
aptly notes, “Plyler extended a right that does not exist, education, to those who
ostensibly have no rights – the undocumented.”
Although Brown v. Board eliminated the de jure exclusion of Latinos and other
students of color, the implementation of school policies that produce segregation-
like outcomes remains in tact. Some have referred to this as a second generation
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of discrimination characterized by the diﬀerential grouping and disciplining of
students driven by characteristics such as their race or ethnicity, or socieconomic
class (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991). While the jus-
tification for student discipline ranges from minor classroom disruptions to more
serious oﬀenses, such as physical and other violent encounters, previous studies
highlight persistent racial discipline gap between minority and non-minority stu-
dents in the face of similar violations of school conduct policies (Skiba et al. 2002;
Gregory, Skiba, and Noguera 2010; Rocque 2010). Comparatively harsher disci-
plinary measures are imposed on Latino students, and recent findings indicate
that they absorb an undue share of the disciplinary practices implemented within
their schools (Stader 2004). This unequal punishment may be particularly trouble-
some for Latino students because it has the potential to exacerbate drop out rates,
inferior employment prospects, and other problems that typically plague Latino
communities.
The implementation of seemingly benign grouping and tracking policies that
aim to improve academic achievement can also produce biased outcomes. The
practices of grouping and tracking are intended to place high achieving, high po-
tential students in direct interactionwith similarly skilled students; at the opposite
end of the performance spectrum, low ability learners are grouped alongside peers
whose skill levels are akin to their own. Such policies are also implemented un-
der the assumption that they are an eﬃcient means of minimizing performance
gaps, increases teaching eﬃciency, and preventing low performing students from
slowing the progress of high achievers (Argys, Rees, and Brewer 1996).
Today, whether such practices generate the desired outcomes is an important
debate within education policy. While there is some indication that ability group-
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ing matters very little for student development (Betts and Shkolnik 2000; Slavin
1990), other findings suggest that under certain circumstances, students placed in
higher-ability groups draw greater benefits than students placed in lower-end cat-
egories (Kerckhoﬀ 1986).
Students of color are more often grouped into lower ability classrooms where
they experience second-rate instruction (Braddock and Slavin 1992). As a result,
grouping and tracking policies have come under heavy scrutiny because of their
potential to institutionalize disparities in academic achievement. They are also
heavily critiqued because they require teachers and administrators to sort students
into diﬀerent groups in ways that eﬀectively re-segregate school (Eyler, Cook, and
Ward 1983). The phenomenon of resegregation in public school systems is the
separation of students by race or ethnicity within de jure integrated schools. It can
be generated by the degree towhich racial or ethnicminorities are overrepresented
in classes for low-achieving pupils, and underrepresented within those reserved
for high-ability learners.
Not only does this process severely limit interaction between students who are
ethnically and racially heterogeneous, it places undue burdens on educational op-
portunities for minority students (Lee 2002). There is strong evidence that Latino
students, despite their rising numbers, are being pushed into separate environ-
ments. Frankenberg and Lee (2002) note while the segregation of black students
has trended downward over time, with few exceptions Latinos in school districts
across the U.S. have experienced increasing segregation.
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3.3 Theoretical Expectations: Fitting Undocumented Students Into the Picture
To date, there has not been a single investigation that grapples with the com-
plex relationship between the grouping and disciplining of all Latino students and
the presence of undocumted Latino students. Hill andHawes (2011) argue that be-
cause of the legal constraints, school districts do not report the oﬃcial citizenship
status of their students. This data limitation is likely an important justification for
why eﬀorts have not been made to explore the link between undocumented Lati-
nos the implementation of various school policies. As a consequence there are
currently no testable hypotheses regarding this relationship. At best, for the pur-
pose of examining the relationships of concern to this study, one is required to
theorize based on the general discussion regarding immigrant children in order to
arrive at testable hypothesis.
A question that arises in the context of grouping and disciplinary polices is
whether undocumented Latino students influence the representation of Latino
students in negative policy areas. Immigrants of Latino origin are often painted as
a threat to a variety of American institutions (as in Huntington 2004a), and pop-
ular conceptions might suggest that undocumented students would lead to unfa-
vorable policy environment for Latino students in general. However, systematic
analyses find that many of the popular myths surrounding Latino immigrants are
not empirical realities.
Research now demonstrates that they are less likely to commit crimes than
native-born Americans (Perez 2009). What this finding points to is the presence of
an immigrant demographic that has the potential to contribute in a positive man-
ner to the standing of the Latino population in a variety of contexts. Additionally,
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the tenuous situation of Latino immigrants incentivizes the kind of productivity
and social interactions that would not result in unwanted attention from the me-
dia, general public, or perhaps even from law enforcement agencies (Kasinitz et al.
2009).
It stands to reason that undocumented Latino students possess a similar set of
incentives. Their undocumented status suggests that there is much more at stake
for them and their families. Undocumented students likely reside in households
with family members – be they parents, siblings, or other relatives – who are also
undocumented. The fear of deportation and separation from their family is a re-
ality for undocumented Latino youth (Arbona et al. 2010). Because of this, undoc-
umented Latinos hold greater incentives to assimilate and incorporate themselves
into their academic settings. Other students face only in-school repercussions for
disruptive behavior in the class.
However, disruptive behavior has potentially more severe implications for un-
documented Latino students. If undocumented Latino students exhibit behavior
that warrants suspension or expulsion, this has the potential to bring unwanted
attention to their undocumented family. Attention from school oﬃcials may be
perceived as a threat to their ability to remain in the U.S. This suggests that they
will avoid engaging in the kinds of behavior that justifies suspension or expulsion.
Consequently, I do not expect the presence of undocumented Latino to be associ-
ated with increases in the disciplining of the Latino population in public schools.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of undocumented Latino students will not be associ-
ated with the negative policy treatment of Latino students
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At the same time, undocumented Latinos are likely to have less experiencewith
U.S. education, and are likely to be less acclimated to the language and culture of
American classrooms. While these are limitations that can significantly limit their
academic development, undocumented Latinos face additional economic obsta-
cles not directly linked with cultural limitations that come in the form of severe
economic pressures. Some research notes that in many cases immigrant Latino
families tend to migrate frequently in search of employment (Gibson and Hidalgo
2009). These economic pressures place additional burdens on undocumented Lati-
nos that severely limit their prospects for academic success. Therefore, I do not
expect that their presence will be positively associated with the placing of Latino
students into favorable policy areas such as classes for the gifted and talented.
Hypothesis 2: The presence of undocumented Latino students will not be posi-
tively associated with the grouping of Latino students in favorable policy areas
Because school districts engage in a variety of political decisions that deter-
mine who gets what in today’s classrooms (Meier and Stewart 1991), this study
also controls for the influence of Latino school board members and teachers on
the outcomes of interest. Not only are Latino school board members likely to pur-
sue policy choices that benefit Latino students, but in the classroom Latino teach-
ers also play a critical role in ameliorating educational inequities. Together, these
two sets of actors have enfranchised the interests of Latino students in a variety
of settings (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Fraga and Elis 2009). In addi-
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tion, Meier and Stewart (1991) find that the presence of Latino educators improved
Latinos’ placement in gifted and talented programs, and decreased Latino dropout
rates while reducing the percentage of Latino students suspended and expelled.
3.4 Empirical Setting
To empirically assess my theoretical expectations, I collect data from two pri-
mary sources: the Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) conducted by the U.S. De-
partment of Education Oﬃce for Civil Rights (OCR), and a set of indicators for
public school districts in the state of Texas reported by the Texas EducationAgency
(TEA). The OCR CRDC survey gathers data regarding civil rights and classroom
outcomes in U.S. school districts disaggregated by race and ethnicity. The sam-
pling period used in this study is 2002, 2004, and 2006. The OCR CRDC provides
the most appropriate and reliable data currently available for this study.
I examine two forms of disciplinary measures – suspensions and expulsions.
Suspensions refer to the number of students excluded from attending school for
a period of no less than one day. In this case, students are ultimately allowed to
return to their classrooms. Expulsions refer to the number of students prohibited
from attending school for disciplinary reasons. Data for students enrolled in gifted
and talented programs, often referred to simply as GT courses, are used as a mea-
sure of student grouping. In relation to their peers, gifted and talented students
are students who are deemed to be academically superior. The OCR definition
indicates that this figure represents the number of students enrolled in courses
specifically tailored for students who possess unusually high academic ability or
talents. Students who require intermittent and episodic support to perform aca-
demic functions, interactionwith others, and other daily activities fall into theOCR
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CRDC category of mild retardation, referred to herein as intellectual disabilities.
Lastly, I analyze CRDC data on high school graduates.
These OCR data are used to construct the various dependent variables in my
analysis. Here, I develop a series of representational ratios similar to those devel-
oped in earlier studies (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989;Meier and Stewart 1991).
These ratios indicate how likely Latino students are to be subjected to specific poli-
cies relative to all other students enrolled in their school district. It should be noted
that this ratio assumes that Latinos should be disciplined or grouped into specific
classes in patterns that closely approximate their share of the student population.
Thus, an index resulting in a figure greater than one would indicate that Latinos
are overrepresented. Conversely, an index of less than one indicates underrepre-
sentation. In order to deal with the skewed nature of these figures, the log of each
odds ratio is used as the dependent variable with the models estimated.
In order to measure how undocumented Latino youth impact the diﬀerential
treatment of all Latinos, I incorporate ameasure of undocumented Latino students
in Texas public school districts developed by Hill and Hawes (2011). The state of
Texas maintains a tracking system for students that designates a unique identifier
tied to each student’s individual security number. When a student registers, he
or she must provide a social security number; when one is not provided, students
are assigned an alternate number by their school district. This process yields the
number of Latinos wihtout such identification served by each district, who are
then assigned alterntative identification numbers. From this, the percentage of
undocumented Latino students, as proxied by the districts’ identification system,
is derived.
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In addition to the aforementioned variables, other district-level factors could
be influencing the outcomes of interest in this study. On the one hand, the com-
position of important political actors in the district need to be accounted for. In
an attempt to account for this, the models estimated in this analysis include mea-
sures of the percentage of Latino teachers in the district along with a measure of
school board representation. This allows me to account for the potent impact of
representation within the classroom and on the school board.
For example, a district’s financial resources can help improve the quality of in-
struction and general learning environment for all students, but during periods
of scarce financial resources and budget austerity Latino students will likely be
dealt the largest blow as programs that enhance Latino performance are exposed
to financial cuts. To control for this, I include a measure of district-level finan-
cial resources. In addition, I control for the presence of African American and
low-income students in the district. Finally, in each of the models estimated the
district’s student-to-teacher ratio is controlled for. Here, all data are reported by
the Texas Education Agency (TEA).
The data being analyzed are a sample of Texas public school districts over sev-
eral years. The spatial and temporal characteristics exhibited by panel observa-
tions suggest that heteroskedasticity could be cause for concern. A set of Breusch-
Pagan tests to formally test for heteroskedasticity was estimated for each model in
this study. To be sure, unequal error variance does not result in biased estimates;
however, the use of OLS will not generate parameter estimates with the smallest
variance in this case (Gujarati and Porter 2009). As such, random eﬀects gener-
alized least squares models with robust standard errors and clustering by school
district are estimated.
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3.5 Findings
3.5.1 Latino Student Suspensions and Expulsions
The quantitative analysis begins by focusing onLatino student suspensions and
expulsions. Students who are suspended are eventually permitted to return to
their classroom. In contrast, when a student is expelled, she or he is removed from
attendance rolls entirely. While removal from the classroom is a considerable bar-
rier in itself, the considerable time it takes for a student to enroll in another school
district can result in significant burdens, as the process of adjusting to new class-
room environments may take an additional toll on one’s educational integration.
The models reported in Table 3.1 shed light on the relationship between the
presence of undocumented Latino students and the disciplinary practices of con-
cern in this study. As it relates to the Latino suspension ratio, the results sug-
gest that the presence of undocumented Latino students is not associated with in-
creases in this policy ratio. According to these findings, an increase in the percent-
age of undocumented Latino students significantly decreases the odds of Latinos
being suspended within the same school district.
Although the size of this eﬀect is not large, it is present in bothmodels including
the one controlling for the influence of teacher and school board representation. In
bothmodels of suspensions, teacher and board representation have little influence
over this outcome. The coeﬃcient estimates for the percentage of low-income and
African American students are both statistically significant. This indicates that as
the presence of Black and low-income students increases at the school district level,
Latino students are less likely to be suspended relative to all others enrolled.
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Table 3.1: Modeling Latino Suspensions
Dependent Variable: Model Model
Suspension Ratio 1 2
Undocumented Latino Students -0.009 -0.008
(0.007) (0.003)
Latino Teacher Percentage -0.001
(0.001)
Latino Board Member Percentage 0.002
(0.001)
Revenue Per-Pupil -0.273 -0.286
(0.057) (0.057)
Low-Income Students -0.004 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001)
African American Students -0.007 -0.007
(0.001) (0.001)
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.043 -0.047
(0.013) (0.015)
Intercept 1.220 1.313
(0.235) (0.272)
N 543 543
R squared 0.15 0.16
F 18.68 14.47
Standard errors in parentheses
 p< :10,  p< :05,  p< :01
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In Table 3.2, models of Latino expulsion ratios are presented. Whereas the re-
lationship between undocumented Latino students and Latino suspensions was
significant, there appears to be no significant association between the presence of
undocumented Latinos and the suspension of all Latino students in their school
district. However, teacher representation is statistically significant indicating the
as district’s employ more Latino teachers, Latino students are less likely to be sus-
pended. More surprising, however, is the relationship that is observed for Latino
board membership.
Several potential mechanisms could help explain this finding. First, it might
be the case that Latino parents encourage administrators to impose stronger over-
sight of their children, leading to school districts with more reactionary expul-
sion guidelines. If this is indeed the case, the coeﬃcient for Latino school board
representation might suggest administrators are responding to such demands in
ways the promote the implementation of comparatively harsh disciplinary sanc-
tions. Second, performance-related motives to keep low-performing students –
in this case Latino students – from deflating districts’ overall achievement on im-
portant benchmarks could incentivize actions that keep low performers out the
classroom. Again, the percentage of low-income students, AfricanAmericans, and
larger classes are meaningful predictors.
3.5.2 Latino Grouping and Graduation
The next indicator evaluated in this analysis measures the odds of Latino stu-
dents being categorized as intellectually disabled. Interestingly, in each of the
models the results indicate that Latino students are less likely to be placed into
this category in response to a greater presence of undocumented Latino students
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Table 3.2: Latino Student Expulsions
Dependent Variable: Model Model
Expulsion Ratio 1 2
Undocumented Latino Students -0.003 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Latino Teacher Percentage -0.004
(0.002)
Latino Board Member Percentage 0.006
(0.002)
Revenue Per-Pupil -0.365 -0.462
(0.319) (0.315)
Low-Income Students -0.0101 -0.013
(0.001) (0.002)
African American Students -0.006 -0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.051 -0.070
(0.021) (0.025)
Intercept 1.843 2.247
(0.436) (0.509)
N 318 318
R squared 0.20 0.22
F 14.81 10.87
Standard errors in parentheses
 p< :10,  p< :05,  p< :01
53
in the school district. Bureaucratic and elected representation, however, are not
related to this outcome. In both models the percentage of low-income students is
negatively related to outcome of interest in Table 3.3, but the relationship is some-
what inconsistent in this regard. Similar to the models of school discipline, Lati-
nos are less likely to represented in this category as the district’s share of African
American students and student-teacher ratio increase.
Table 3.3: Latino Intellectual Disability
Dependent Variable: Model Model
Intellectual Disability Ratio 1 2
Undocumented Latino Student -0.012 -0.017
(0.008) (0.008)
Latino Teacher Percentage -0.001
(0.004)
Latino Board Member Percentage -0.001
(0.003)
Revenue Per-Pupil -0.302 -0.270
(0.234) (0.243)
Low-Income Students -0.007 -0.006
(0.002) (0.003)
African American Students -0.018 -0.019
(0.003) (0.004)
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.104 -0.096
(0.028) (0.033)
Intercept 2.455 2.285
(0.556) (0.633)
N 183 183
R squared 0.32 0.33
F 16.56 12.50
Standard errors in parentheses
 p< :10,  p< :05,  p< :01
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Table 3.4 reports the findings for the Latino gifted and talented ratio. Enroll-
ment in gifted and talented courses gives students exposure to high quality instruc-
tion andprovide the foundation needed for long-term academic success. However,
undocumented Latinos, due to the barriers they likely face in the classroom ,might
be less likely to be enrolled in gifted and talented programs relative to other stu-
dents.
The significant and negative coeﬃcients for undocumented Latinos are sugges-
tive of this, as the results indicates Latino students in general are less likely to be
represented among the ranks of gifted and talented students as the presence of un-
documented Latino students in their school district increases. This indicates that
Latino students will experience greater underrepresentation within this group of
high ability learners. Within the sample being analyzed, model 2 also reveals that
increase in Latino teachers and school board members within a district can help
bolster the likelihood of Latinos being enrolled in gifted and talented classes.
The tangible benefits of a high school diploma are almost innumerable. Though
it is not a suﬃcient condition for various forms of mobility, it is unquestionably a
necessary one and it marks an important benchmark in the educational trajectory
of Latinos. In Table 3.5, the results reveal that increases in undocumented Latinos
students are negatively related to high school graduation of the larger Latino stu-
dent population. This result is not surprising given the significant burdens that
undocumented Latinos face. Such burdens are often enough to put an early end
to their educational development, and eﬀectively end their incorporation through
education. This is observed in both models. In the equation that controls for rep-
resentation, the eﬀects of increases in Latino teachers are line with theoretical ex-
pectations and increase the odds that Latinos will graduate from high school.
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Table 3.4: Latino Gifted and Talented Students
Dependent Variable: Model Model
Gifted and Talented Ratio 1 2
Undocumented Latino Students -0.013 -0.009
(0.004) (0.004)
Latino Teacher Percentage 0.006
(0.003)
Latino Board Member Percentage 0.004
(0.001)
Revenue Per-Pupil 0.358 0.223
(0.083) (0.077)
Low-Income Students 0.011 0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
African American Students 0.001 0.008
(0.002) (0.002)
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.024 -0.020
(0.013) (0.014)
Intercept -1.806 -0.932
(0.242) (0.260)
N 628 628
R squared 0.22 0.29
F 39.04 111.1
Standard errors in parentheses
 p< :10,  p< :05,  p< :01
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Table 3.5: Latino Diploma Recipients
Dependent Variable: Model Model
Diploma Ratio 1 2
Undocumented Latino Students -0.011 -0.010
(0.003) (0.003)
Latino Teacher Percentage 0.003
(0.001)
Latino Board Member Percentage 0.001
(0.001)
Revenue Per-Pupil 0.055 0.016
(0.053) (0.053)
Low-Income Students 0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
African American Students -0.005 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.009 -0.025
(0.009) (0.011)
Intercept -0.196 0.101
(0.166) (0.194)
N 642 642
R squared 0.13 0.14
F 20.33 40.50
Standard errors in parentheses
 p< :10,  p< :05,  p< :01
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3.6 Discussion of Findings and Implications
Using previous research as a point of departure, I reexamine some of the ed-
ucational practices that have come to be known as second generation discrimina-
tion while bringing undocumented Latino students into this discussion. Since the
findings of earlier studies, most notably Meier and Stewart (1991), the Latino pop-
ulation in the United States has changed dramatically. This change is visible not
only in terms of Latinos’ rising numbers, but also in terms of the composition of
the Latino population. The sheer increase in Latinos alone means that there are
now far more Latino students, and the significant growth in the number of undoc-
umented families brings with it an increased presence of undocumented Latino
students. This study addresses the more diﬃcult question of what increases in
undocumented Latinos suggest for the punitive policies levied upon Latino stu-
dents in school districts across the state of Texas.
Several aspects make these school districts an ideal fit for the current study.
For one, Texas is a state with a significant Latino population that continues to ex-
pand. Latino students are now the majority demographic enrolled in Texas public
schools. Texas is also a particularly salient setting because of its close proximity
to the largest sender of Latino immigrants to the U.S., and the presence of undoc-
umented Latino youth in its public school districts has likely increased in recent
years.
Using a recently developed proxy of undocumented Latino students in the state
of Texas, I find that their presence does not significantly increase the representa-
tion of Latinos among the body of students sanctioned within Texas’ public school
districts. I have argued that this is reflective of the incentives that undocumented
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Latino students have to avoid bringing unwanted scrutiny to themselves and, more
importantly, their families. Yet, there is yet another side to this story. The findings
indicate that as the percentage of undocumented Latino students increases, the
Latino student population in general is not only less likely to be enrolled in gifted
and talented programs, they are also less likely to be represented among the ranks
of high school graduates.
Entrance into gifted and talented programs occurs early on in a student’s aca-
demic development. Although students may be required to pass exams or display
a certain level of aptitude before being enrolled in gifted and talented courses,
teacher recommendation early on can be an important step in this process. If a
greater undocumented student presence results in less Latino gifted and talented
enrollment, this could suggest that fewer teacher recommendations are occurring.
The question then becomes, how do teachers distinguish citizen Latinos from the
undocumented ones? While it is unlikely that teachers have direct access to a stu-
dent’s citizenship status, they observe the students on a daily basis, they recognize
who the Latinos English speakers are versus the native Spanish-speaking students,
and they are also likely to interact with parents periodically during parent-teacher
conferences and other meetings.
All of these are signals that teachers and administrators may rely upon to clas-
sify Latino students, and these signals may be used to determine which students
are given the opportunity to be in gifted and talented programs. To be sure, the
data used in this study are not fully capable of explicitly measuring such mecha-
nisms. It must also be understood that the data in this do not measure the direct
impact of undocumented Latinos on documented Latinos; to claim that the data
in the analysis shed explicit light on such a relationship would be an ecological
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falacy. While this study captures the various associations between education pol-
icy trends encompassing all Latino students and the presence of Latino students
who, based on the measure used in this study, are undocumented, it is important
to consider the mechanisms of this relationship because it sets an important stage
for future research eﬀorts.
For Latinos, educational opportunities are the lifeblood of mobility and incor-
poration. Gándara and Contreras (2009, 13) assert that “Education is the single
most eﬀective way to integrate the burgeoning population of Latinos into the U.S.
economy and society.” However, a now consistent finding is that Latinos, through
the application of some of the policies examined in this study, are often separated
from this form of integration by schools and other bureaucracies that punish mi-
nority groups. Perhaps the most insidious form of this is the growing presence of
a school-to-prison pipeline, the now institutionalized process that disproportion-
ately disciplining and removes minority students from public schools, increasing
their odds of being sanctioned by the larger criminal justice system.
Whilemuch of the related research focuses onAfricanAmerican students, there
ismounting evidence that Latino youth are increasingly subjected to harsher forms
of school discipline than other students (Stader 2004), and are more likely to be re-
moved from the classroom than students from other racial groups for virtually
identical infractions (Skiba et al. 2011). The school-to-prison pipeline for Latino
is without question the result of many variables that reach beyond the scope of
the current eﬀort. Still, the current eﬀort is salient in this regard as it provides an
initial glimpse into what the presence of undocumented Latino students portends
for forms of in-school discipline that have now become an important predictor of
Latinos’ experience with the larger, and ever expanding, carceral state.
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4. STRATEGIC REPRESENTATION, LATINOS, AND EDUCATIONAL
OUTCOMES
4.1 On Performance and Bureaucratic Representation
For scholars and practitioners alike, understanding how public organizations
perform is a fundamental objective. The pursuit of this objective has produced an
expansive literature spanning the fields of sociology, psychology, and, naturally,
public administration, with much of it emphasizing the importance of manage-
ment in organizational life. Though how organizations function tends to be driven
by an array of internal and external forces, researchers continually place public
managers at the forefront of organizational performance (Simon 1957; Nicholson-
Crotty andO’Toole 2004;Walker and Boyne 2006;Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald, and
Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Moynihan and Pandey 2010; O’Toole Jr. and Meier 2011).
In a public sector characterized by increasing complexity in the design and im-
plementation of policy, performance serves as a ubiquitous cue that guides man-
agerial decisions. The premium placed on the performance of governmental pro-
grams, and organizations’multiple performance objectives are primary reasons for
this (Box 1999; Rainey 2009). Today there is little doubt that performance occupies
a central role in the culture and governance of public organizations (Romzek and
Ingraham 2000; Moynihan 2008; Moynihan and Hawes 2012). Simply put, public
managers influence and are influenced by performance.
At the same time, the confines of democratic governance suggest that public or-
ganizations and theirmanagers are taskedwithmore than enhancing performance
(Box et al. 2001). Public organizations bridge the expanse between policymakers
61
and the public by delivering essential services in education, law enforcement, and
social welfare. As a consequence, while managerial decisions sway performance,
they also bear significant implications for clientele who rely on the eﬀective deliv-
ery of public programs to meet their policy-related needs. Here, the choices that
managers make influence citizens through their impact on the outcomes of policy.
And while one cannot ignore that managerial decisions are driven performance
objectives, that administrative decisions can be shaped by management’s personal
identification with certain social groups must also be taken into account.
This is particularly the case with public managers from groups that lack repre-
sentation in governing institutions. For thesemanagers, decisions can be driven by
both extrinsic performance related and intrinsic socially oriented motives. These
motives combine to aﬀect how minority managers make decisions. Yet, precisely
how remains unclear. When facedwith the confluence ofmultiple performance ob-
jectives and clientele-attachments, how do minority managers choose which area
of performance to pursue? An answer to this essential question of contemporary
decision-making in public organizations is absent from existing literature. There-
fore, the purpose of this article is to introduce an initial theoretical response, along
with an empirical depiction of the policy outcomes that ensue.
Any serious eﬀort to formulate and empirically assess new theory begins with
a point of departure grounded in an established literature. Relative to other promi-
nent literatures in public administration, studies of representative bureaucracy of-
fer themost useful starting point for understanding howamanager’s identification
with certain clientele can influence her or his decisions. As a theoretical lens, repre-
sentative bureaucracy underscores both the symbolic and practical implications of
a convergence between organizational and clientele demographics. Indeed, there
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appears to be growing evidence that representation in organizations is more than
symbolic given its tangible aﬀect on various measures of performance (for ex-
ample see Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006;
Keiser et al. 2002). Still, despite the long-standing concerns surrounding represen-
tation and democratic responsiveness of the public sector (Kingsley 1944; Krislov
1974; Selden 1997; Meier 1993b; Wilkins and Williams 2009; Bradbury and Kel-
lough 2011), researchers have failed to account for how performance and decision-
making shape the representation-responsiveness link. This study marks an eﬀort
to improve upon this deficiency.
Although there are salient connections among multiple performance objec-
tives, administrative decision-making, and bureaucratic representation, this study
is the first to advance a theory of precisely how they are intertwined— and why it
matters — by introducing a theory of strategic representation. Strategic represen-
tation is concernedwith the relationship betweenmultiple performance objectives
and representation by an organization’s managers. The core contention of this the-
ory is that minority administrators will not abstain from pursuing the interests of
specific groups when deciding which area of performance to engage; they will
instead be strategic by focusing on their organization’s most salient area of perfor-
mance, eﬀectively enhancing one area of performance over others.
An empirical test of the theory proposed herein is developed using represen-
tation in the context of racial and ethnic identification, with the performance of
educational organizations as the policy setting. To be sure, the quantitative anal-
ysis presented herein does not directly test managerial behavior. The goal of the
analysis is to establish initial empirical support for the theory being proposed by
demonstrating how organizational performance would essentially look if, in this
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case, theory comports with real-world behavior. As discussed in subsequent sec-
tions, the analysis arrives at strong initial support. Further, while racial and ethnic
identification is the focus of the analysis, the theory is not limited to representa-
tion based on race. It is intended to generalize to other salient identities such as
gender or, given the recent developments in the literature, previous professional
experiences (e.g one’s status as a milary veteran).
Public education is the policy setting of this study. The education outcome gaps
that persist between students fromdiﬀerent racial groups continue to fuel substan-
tial theoretical and practical debate. While the practical implications of this article
matter for organizational performance and service to clientelemore generally, they
also underscore the conditions under which representation in public schools is an
eﬀective means of improving minority student achievement.
4.2 Representative Bureaucracy: Where the Theory Stands
At its core, the theory of representative bureaucracy addresses the political le-
gitimacy of public organizations. Policies that foster a diverse labor force oﬀer
policymakers an important means of increasing the political legitimacy of govern-
mental organizations since a demographically diverse organization is thought to
embody the diverse preferences of the general public. Initially proposed by Kings-
ley (1944) in his study of the British civil service, Kingsley observed that elected
representatives and bureaucrats hailed from similar social cleavages. Since these
groups held similar values and preferences related to issues of political salience,
at the time of Kingsley’s study the composition of British bureaucracy ensured
that the implementation of governmental policies would reflect ruling-class pref-
erences.
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In the context of organizations in theU.S., while the theory of representative bu-
reaucracy engages the social origins of public personnel, scholars have built upon
normative claims to argue that a representative public sector enfranchises a plural-
ity of interests. Recognizing that modern democracy brought with it an increase in
bureaucratic governance, Levitan (1946, 566) argued that “The very continuance of
the democratic system depends on our ability to combine administrative responsi-
bility with administrative discretion." Levitan (1946) also held that the democratic
responsiveness of American bureaucracy is at its highest when the composition of
public organizations mirrors that of the public it serves. Others supported Levi-
tan’s position by contending that bureaucratic representation could improve de-
ficiencies in general representation that were left by unresponsive elected institu-
tions (Long 1952).
Buildingupon early normative perspectives, contemporary research has sought
to uncover the causal mechanisms linking organizational demographics with how
organizations actually perform. According to Mosher (1982), bureaucratic repre-
sentation embodies a passive form that is observed when bureaucrats and their
clientele can be grouped into a single demographic. This commonality implies
a sharing of life experiences that result in a common set of values and prefer-
ences. Organizations passively represent these values when their personnel and
their clientele come from the same demographic. Some have argued that passive
representation can itself improve organizational outcomes, albeit indirectly, when
minority bureaucrats influence the behavior of their non-minority employees (Lim
2006). Indirect impacts can also resultwhenpassively representative organizations
appears increasingly amenable to minority interests, leading minority clientele to
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engage in behaviors that influence how an organization serves them (Meier and
Nicholson-Crotty 2006).
While the indirect consequences of passive representation have received mod-
erate attention, the direct implications appear to have captured the bulk of schol-
arly attention. Mosher (1982) underscored the potential for direct eﬀects by argu-
ing that bureaucratic representation also embodies an active form. Active repre-
sentation occurs when the symbolic bonds shared by members of the same group
influence the behavior of those within the organization, resulting in benefits for
members of a specific group (Meier 1993b). The implication here is that public em-
ployees cognitively identify clientelewithwhom they descriptively identify. These
clientele then become part of what some have referred to as a target-group (for
example Lim 2006). Bureaucrats then advance policies and programs that can im-
prove target-group outcomes. This process suggests that social identities such as
race, age, or gender can have a meaningful impact on the implementation public
policy.
Some have found that these identities become particularly influential whenmi-
nority administrators assume the role of minority representative. For example,
Sowa and Selden (2003) find that when administrators focus their eﬀorts on tradi-
tional objectives such as eﬃciency and aggregate performance, they are less likely
to take risks on behalf of certain groups. The same study also finds that when
administrators embrace their status as a representative of minority-group prefer-
ences, outcomes for minority clientele are more likely to improve.
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4.2.1 Searching for Evidence of Bureaucratic Representation
To date, empirical analyses fall into one of two subsets. The first of these probes
for passive representation by examiningwhether certain indicators of bureaucratic
demographymatch general populationdemographics. Using this approach,Meier
(1975) finds that the degree of similarity in age, income, and education of bureau-
crats depends on the level of bureaucracy in question. Meier and Nigro (1976)
arrive at a similar conclusion, and also find little support for the presence of atti-
tude congruence, or the degree to which policy preferences of bureaucrats match
the public’s preferences. In a related context, Riccucci and Saidel (1997) develop an
aggregate measure of representation among political appointees within state gov-
ernment. Their study points to the underrepresentation of racial minorities and
women among the ranks of state-level policy oﬃcials. More recent work by Lewis
and Pitts (2011) concludes that the representation of gay men and lesbian women
in bureaucracy is higher in states with policies that protect gay and lesbian rights.
Does the presence of minority personnel aﬀect organizational responsiveness
to minority preferences? The second subset of empirical literature addresses this
question. A growing consensus in the literature establishes a significant associa-
tion between the presence of minority employees and favorable outcomes for un-
derrepresented groups (Meier and Stewart 1992; Coleman, Brudney, and Kellough
1998; Keiser et al. 2002;Meier andNicholson-Crotty 2006;Wilkins andKeiser 2006).
As an illustration, there is now evidence that female representation in the bureau-
cracy can increase the scope of attention devoted to women’s issues (Park 2012).
Against the backdrop of law enforcement, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006)
study the relationship between female representation and gendered policy out-
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comes. While an increased presence of female police oﬃcers resulted in a higher
volume of arrests related to sexual assault in that study, the presence of these fe-
male bureaucrats was also linked to the decreased reluctance of female sexual as-
sault victims to report crimes committed against them.
4.2.2 Race, Representation, and Performance in Education
A prominent line of existing work explores the relationship between racial rep-
resentation and the performance of educational organizations. In important ways,
such work builds upon the work of education policy scholars that argues a lack of
racial representation in schools disadvantages minority students. One disadvan-
tage stems from negative perceptions of minorities that shape how white teachers
approach their minority students. These perceptions can be the result of a cultural
disconnect (Kea and Utley 1998) that fosters biases regarding minority-student
ability (Persell 1977). Such perceptions can lead white teachers to dedicate less
time and eﬀort to addressing the needs of minorities in their classroom (McCarthy
et al. 2005).
However, when racial representation is observed, the likelihood of minority
students gaining access to rigorous coursework that bolsters future academic de-
velopment increases (Klopfenstein 2005). Given that teachers occupy roles akin to
what Lipsky (1980) referred to as street-level bureaucrats, public administration
research has focused largely on the relationship between teacher demographics
and student outcomes, much of it concluding that minority students benefit from
minority representation because it fosters equitable learning environments for mi-
nority students, and is also associatedwith improvements inminority student per-
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formance (Meier 1984; Meier and Stewart 1991; Pitts 2007; Roch, Pitts, andNavarro
2010).
Considerably less attention has been devoted to understanding the circum-
stances under which minority school administrators improve how their organi-
zations serve minority students. Of the studies that have been conducted, the
implications of top-level representation for appearance appear to be mixed. For
example, Meier (1993a) finds that administrative representation results in positive
outcomes when principals and students are of the same race, but only after a crit-
ical mass of administrators is observed. In a separate study, Pitts (2005) develops
a measure of representation that combines top and mid-level administration into
a single metric. That study finds a strong positive relationship between overall
student performance and administrative representation. In another study of man-
agement, Pitts (2007) also finds that administrative representation aﬀected black
student outcomes, but mattered little for white or Latino outcomes. Insignificant
relationships are also reported by recent studies that examine the eﬀect of admin-
istrative representation on the use of disciplinary policies on minority students
(Roch, Pitts, and Navarro 2010; Roch and Pitts 2012).
4.3 Taking Decision Making Seriously: A Theory of Strategic Representation
Diverse actors in public organizations make decisions that benefit disadvan-
taged groups, and in doing so help bolster general levels of public sector respon-
siveness. This is perhaps the broadest and most valuable perspective generated
by representative bureaucracy research. However, a significant weakness in such
analyses has been the lack of consideration for decision-making processes, and
how theymight aﬀect organizational performance in the context of representation.
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As Jones (2003, 395) claims, “Most people who study politics and government care
little about the fine details of the specifics of human cognition; they are quite con-
tent to leave that to biologists, psychologists, and cognitive scientists. What they
cannot escape, however, is the need for some firm foundation that can link human
behavior to macropolitics.” This statement can be applied directly to representa-
tive bureaucracy studies. Only by taking decision making seriously can this line
of research begin to uncover the conditions under which representation in organi-
zations yields the anticipated outcomes, as well as the conditions under which it
does not.
In private aswell as public organizations,managers are required to navigate en-
vironments rife with uncertainty. For the public manager, this uncertainty forces
them to maximize performance by selecting from a set of alternative paths, or pol-
icy options, with limited information at their disposal. This limited information
can result from time and resource constraints, or from a lack of relative expertise.
In either case, managers make decisions under conditions of bounded rationality
(March 1978; Simon 1991; Kahneman 2003). Bounded rationality is an alternative
to the rational, full information understanding of decision making (Conlisk 1996).
Rationality implies that decision makers possess essentially perfect information
regarding the optimal course of action to take given a finely specified objective
(Conlisk 1996). However, this view has been regarded as untenable given uncer-
tain conditions in practice, and the ability of bounded rationality to more appro-
priately explicate the actions and choices of policymakers (Jones 2002, 2003).
Recent work has set out to develop a formal theory of how public managers use
performance information to make strategic decisions under the assumption that
managerial decisions are driven entirely by organizational performance (Meier
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2012). Taking into account the constraints on the stream of information managers
can acquire, this study makes two key assumptions. The first key assumption in
this study is that managers use performance as a decision rule. But why?
The answer lies in the nature of public management as a profession. Minor-
ity managers, like all other managers, often times do not set their organization’s
agenda. Generally, it is rare that public managers experience levels of autonomy
akin to the level experienced by managers in private firms (Wilson 1991). They
are unable to distribute privately earned benefits to public sector bureaucrats, and
unable to acquire and use factors of production without oversight. But most im-
portantly, public managers do not select their own objectives. Their goals are dic-
tated to them in a top-down political process, where signals from political oﬃcials
dictate the salience of various performance objectives.
Therefore, by using performance as a decision rule, managers are able to miti-
gate the risk associatedwith uncertainty in choosing among a set of policy alterna-
tives. This use of performance as a decision rule is also important because it sug-
gests that managers will not make decisions without first taking into account the
political signals that determine their organization’s most salient performance ob-
jectives. Deviating from a performance-enhancing path would be irrational, since
pursuing a path that does not bolster performance can result in their eventual re-
moval from the organization.
The second key assumption is that while minorities in management are con-
cerned with performance, they are also concerned with the preferences of minor-
ity clientele. It is plausible that minority managers feel a strong identification with
clientele of the same racial, ethnic, or age group. They may feel as though they
belong to them, have lived similar lives, and as a result have intrinsic incentives
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for identifying ways to improve how these clients perceive their organization and
how their organization serves them.
Yet, even in cases where minority managers do not feel intrinsically attached
to minority clients, there are clear extrinsic motives for improving service delivery
to minorities, such as avoiding negative claims by minority groups, preventing
unwanted press, and avoiding calls for management’s removal. For the minority
manager, therefore, utility is a function of both organizational performance and
minority satisfaction.
The presence of these seemingly competing utility inputs has important impli-
cations for management’s impact on various policy outcomes. Since public orga-
nizations pursue multiple objectives simultaneously, multiple outcome gaps are
likely to be present. Here, performance gaps between minority and non-minority
outcomes are particularly salient because they informmanagement that corrective
measures are required to ameliorate an existing disparity. Previous scholars argue
that organizations approach multiple objectives in a sequential fashion (Cyert and
March 1963). From a managerial vantage point, even without stipulations about
the rank-ordering of objectives, a sequential approach implies that one objective
is given more weight than others. The next logical step is to distinguish which
performance gap will receive the most attention from minority managers.
Aswith non-minoritieswhooccupy administrative positions,minorities inman-
agement are concerned with retaining their positions of organizational authority.
To do so, they must be keenly mindful of their agency’s most politically salient
performance objectives. As it relates to the potential for active representation, this
does not imply that a minority manager will abstain from substantively represent-
ing minority clientele, and it does not imply that minority managers will exacer-
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bate minority outcome gaps. Resource constraints and competing demands sug-
gest that they will focus their representation on one area over others. When faced
withmultiple outcome gaps,minoritymanagerswill channel active representation
through their organization’s primary goal by addressing the outcome gap linked
to the most salient performance objective. They will do so because this is the out-
come gap that is the costliest to ignore. When considering multiple performance gaps
relating to minority client outcomes, this leads to the general hypothesis that the direct in-
fluence of minority managers on performance will be strongest for their organization’s most
salient outcome gap and less pronounced in other areas of performance.
4.4 The Empirical Setting
An empirical test of the theorized relationship between management and per-
formance requires an organizational settingwithmultiple outcomes that are salient
to minority groups. Given this, the policy setting for the empirical analysis in this
study is public education. Specifically, the focus is on the relationship between
Latino representation and Latino student outcomes. The analysis is conducted at
the school-district level.
Educational organizations provide a rich empirical setting for addressing the
focal question for several reasons. For one, public school districts are now the
largest number of public agencies in the United States (O’Toole Jr. andMeier 2011).
While the lack of multiple objective performance measures for a single organiza-
tion can pose an analytical constraint, public school districts are required to sub-
mit myriad performance data to their state’s education agency. This creates a large
cache of data that capture numerous aspects of how these organizations function,
including various indicators of performance. In addition, independent school dis-
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tricts are governed by a locally elected group of board members in charge of se-
lecting the superintendent of their district. Superintendents exert substantial in-
fluence over personnel, budgetary, and curriculum decisions that shape how their
school districts function.
The data set used in this study includes indicators from 1,050 school districts
in the state of Texas during the period of 1999 through 2010.1 Table 4.1 reports
the number of Latino and white superintendents in the state of Texas during the
time period in the sample. According to Table 4.1, since 1999 the number of white
superintendents in Texas has trended downward. In 2010, there were 89 Latino
superintendents, marking an increase of approximately 35 percent relative to the
first year in the sample.2
Table 4.1: Superintendents in Texas: 1999-2010
Year White Superintendents Latino Superintendents
1999 947 66
2000 943 68
2001 930 69
2002 932 71
2003 905 74
2004 905 75
2005 901 75
2006 893 84
2007 885 88
2008 890 88
2009 876 93
2010 859 89
1Data analyzed in this study are published online via the Texas Education Agency (TEA) Aca-
demic Excellence Indicator System at http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis. Superintendent
race data were obtained via a TEA open records request. All charter schools operating during this
period are excluded from my analysis.
2During the time period in this analysis, the number of African American superintendents also
increased, albeit at a rate much slower than that of their Latino counterparts. In 1999, the TEA
reports that only 15 superintendents of Texas school districts were African American. By 2010, this
figure had risen to just 28.
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During this period, approximately 5 percent of the superintendents in my data
sample were African American, and less than 1 percent were from another racial
category. Thus, superintendents that did not fall under the Latino or white cate-
gory were omitted from the sample. In order to examine whether top-level minor-
ity managers focus more attention on oneminority outcome gap over others as my
theory suggests, I construct a dichotomous measure equal to 1 if a superintendent
is Latino, and equal to 0 if otherwise. White superintendents are left as the un-
coded category. As a measure of Latino representation within the organization’s
lower-level, the percentage of teachers within school districts who are Latino is
used.
Three areas of school district performance are used to test the proposed hy-
potheses. These include standardized test pass rates (TAAS/TAKS)3, average SAT
exam performance, and the percentage of students scoring above 1110 on the SAT
test (otherwise referred to as the college-bound gap or college-ready gap). In general,
analyzing more than one area of performance is ideal, because it yields a broader
picture of how an organization is serving its clientele. Rather than focusing on a
measure of how one group of students is performing, the outcome gap between
Latino and white student achievement in each of these areas is used as the depen-
dent variable analyzed. These gaps are calculated by subtracting the measure of
Latino student performance from the white performance measure. This approach
allows one to speak directly to the issue of whether Latino superintendents focus
most of their attention on the gap that is linked to the most salient performance
area. Performance gap summaries are reported in Table 4.2.
3Until 2002, the standardized exam implemented in the state of Texas was the Texas Assessment
of Academic Skills (TAAS) exam. That test was replaced by the Texas Assessment of Knowledge
and Skills (TAKS) exam in 2003.
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Table 4.2: Performance Gap Summaries
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Gap in State Standardized Exam Pass Rate 15.66 11.82 -47.50 85.60
Gap in SAT Exam Performance 89.86 61.13 -207 444
Gap in College-Ready Performance 16.76 12.59 -70.90 80
Percentage of Latino Teachers in District 9.32 19.07 0 100
Teacher Salaries $35,256 $6,140 $17,822 $72,393
Student-Teacher Ratio 12.72 2.54 1.4 57.4
Average Teacher Experience 12.01 2.37 0 28.4
Instructional Expenditures Per Pupil $3,984 $1,352 $226 $21,206
Latino Student Percentage 29.30 26.86 0 100
African American Student Percentage 8.09 12.03 0 92
Low Income Student Percentage 49.15 19.25 0 100
As a policy setting, Texas education is strongly characterized by an emphasis on
performance driven accountability, as the state was among the first to implement
substantial accountability reformsduring the 1980s (Palmer andRangel 2011). Fur-
ther, Texas style accountability has come to be recognized as an influential force in
the passage of theNoChild Left BehindAct of 2001 (Heilig andDarling-Hammond
2008). The performance-focused culture of public education in Texas oﬀers a fruit-
ful setting for examining whether minority managers place more emphasis on one
performance gap over others, particular since performance driven accountability
in this state centers almost entirely on state standardized test scores. In this analy-
sis the gap that is linked with the most salient performance area is the gap in state
standardized test performance (the TAAS/TAKS gap).
The other gaps reported in Table 4.2 are secondary gaps. These gaps are “sec-
ondary" because they fall beyond the direct purview of performance accountabil-
ity. To be sure, this is not to say school administrators fully disregard how their
organization performs in areas other than standardized tests. It is to say, however,
that schools do face a variety of oversightmechanisms linked solely to performance
on statewide standardized exams, and also face penalties for consistent low per-
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formance in this regard. Additionally, as Table 2 reports, each gap ranges from
positive to negative values. A focal element of this study is the distance, or gap,
between minorities and non-minorities as it relates to policy outcomes, or settings
whereminority clientele are underserved by the organization. Here, it is important
to note that when the data indicate a negative outcome gap, these are school dis-
tricts where Latino students are outperforming whites. Because situations where
Latino student performance lags behind white performance are of primary theo-
retical concern in this analysis, negative gaps are not analyzed.
A vast literature indicates that student outcomes are subject to numerous forces
in their environment (for example Hanushek 1986, 1997). Several control variables
account for some of the relationships that are typically included within quantita-
tive analyses of educational performance. Since performance gaps are analyzed,
the variables might only be significant if they produce a diﬀerent eﬀect for Latino
and white students. The diﬀerential eﬀects that these variables have on various
performance gaps have not been the subject of theoretical or empirical concern
within existing literature. Nonetheless, several control variables account for other
potential drivers of performance. The influence of financial resources on student
performance is accounted for by including teacher salary and instructional expen-
ditures per-pupil, both measured in thousands of dollars. Teacher experience can
also matter, as one might expect that more experienced teachers would be a gener-
ally positive force in classrooms. On the constraint side, controls for the student-
to-teacher ratio and the percentage of low-income students are also included. The
analysis also controls for the percentage of students who are Latino.
Ordinary least-squares regression models are utilized herein. However, the
panel data set contains some important characteristics. First, diagnostics indicated
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the presence of heteroskedastic error variance in each of the models.4 To account
for this, all models are estimatedwith robust standard errors. A lagged dependent
variable is also included in each model. Including the lagged outcome gap as a
regressor in each equation accounts for the relationship between performance in
period t and performance in period t-1.
To account for the potential common eﬀect of unobserved factors thatmay have
influenced the performance of all school districts during the years in question, a set
of dichotomous year dummy variables is included in each specification. Since the
period under question is 1999 to 2010, 1999 is the base year. The final model spec-
ifications reported in this study are robust to several alternative specifications, in-
cluding ordinary least squares without year dummy variables, models with panel
corrected standard errors, and generalized least squares specifications with fixed
eﬀects.
4.5 Empirical Results
In order to test the general hypothesis proposed, two separate sets of equations
are estimated. Three models are estimated within each set, with each model sep-
arately examining how representation within diﬀerent levels of the educational
organizations in question influences Latino student gaps in the areas of standard-
ized tests, SAT exams, and the percentage of Latino students deemed to be college-
bound. The purpose of the first set of equations is to elucidatemanagement’s eﬀect
on performance in the absence of minority bureaucrats, since frommanagement’s
standpoint, the hiring of minority bureaucrats may be the most prominent means
of indirectly influencing performance. Given this, each equation models perfor-
4A series of Breusch-Pagan tests generated chi-square statistics that in each model rejected the
null hypothesis of constant error variance
78
mance gaps as a function of Latino representation in top-level management, the
outcome gap exhibited for the prior year, and several control variables.
In this way, the first three equations speak to the relationship between Latino
superintendents and Latino student gapswithout direct consideration of the eﬀect
Latino teachers have on the outcomes of interest5.
According to Table 4.3, with respect to the TAAS/TAKS equation, there is a
significant and negative relationship between the presence of a Latino superin-
tendent and the standardized test gap. This finding supports the theoretical claim
thatminority outcome gaps can be improvedwhen the organizations serving them
provide representation within top-levels of administration. Some of the control
variables reported in the first column of Table 4.3 also merit discussion. First, the
coeﬃcient for the student-teacher ratio is somewhat surprising. A higher student-
teacher ratio often implies larger individual rooms, and larger classrooms can di-
minish a teacher’s ability to focus on students’ individual needs. This can be par-
ticularly important for Latino student gaps, as one might expect more individual
attention would be required to improve disparate performance.
While the exact mechanisms underlying this result are unclear, in column 1
the student-teacher coeﬃcient appears to imply the opposite relationship. The
relationship reported between average teacher experience and the standardized
test gap is also interesting. Conventional wisdom suggests that more experience
improves one’s ability to perform. Insofar as closing the gaps would be considered
5Analyzing only the positive gaps can lead to concerns regarding selection based on the depen-
dent variable. There are strong theoretical reasons for focusing solely on situations where Latino
student performance lags behind white student performance. However, in order to address con-
cerns regarding this approach, a separate set of models were estimated using all gaps as the depen-
dent variable. Is it important to note that the impacts of managerial representation on the primary
performance gap reported in this and subsequent sections hold in models with all gaps included
in the analysis as well.
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favorable performance, the average teacher coeﬃcient suggests that an increase in
average teacher experience widens the Latino achievement gap on standardized
tests. Similar relationships for these control variables are foundwithin eachmodel
reported by Table 4.3.
In the second column of Table 4.3, management’s influence on the gap in aver-
age SAT test performance of Latino students is tested. Although there is a negative
relationship between managerial representation and the SAT gap, this coeﬃcient
estimate is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. To be sure, this finding does not
suggest that the distance separating Latino and white students on the SAT test
widenswithin school districts headed byLatino superintendents. However, it does
suggest that in this case the influence of representation by top-level education ad-
ministrators falls short of the eﬀect thatwould be required to substantially improve
the average SAT performance of Latino students.
According to the results reported in Table 4.3, while Latino managers appear
to have no significant influence on the average performance of Latinos on the SAT
test, Latino superintendents are significantly associated with a decrease in the per-
formance gap between Latino and white students performing above the mean on
the same test. Why might managerial representation matter for the performance
of high-achieving minority students but not those whose scores are average? Al-
though the process underlying this particular finding is unclear, one possible ratio-
nale is that Latino superintendents could potentially be advancing school-district
initiatives or developing programs aimed at increasing the chances that higher-
scoring Latino students will move on to pursue a post-secondary education. While
the potential existence of such initiatives does not necessarily imply a trade-oﬀ be-
tween the success of average and high performing Latino students, it could sug-
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gest that the presence of such programs is not enough to substantively improve
the performance of Latinos who score near their district’s average Latino scores.
Again, this is but one possible rationale, and understanding whether it is the best
explanation would require a separate analysis.
The theory advanced in the article argues that minority managers will focus
their eﬀorts on the outcome gap tied to their organization’s foremost performance
objectives. Therefore, the positive impact ofminoritymanagers should be strongest
for their organization’smost salient outcome gap. Collectively, the results reported
in Table 4.4 support the theoretical predictions for performance. In this study, the
most salient performance gap for educational organizations is the gap in Latino
TAAS/TAKS pass rates. As Table 4.4 reports, the relationship between this gap
and Latino representation in management is negative and significant. This sug-
gests that Latino superintendents are associated with improvements in this Latino
outcome disparity that go above and beyond other mechanisms such as playing a
direct role in the hiring of minority bureaucrats.
Within this analysis the secondary outcome gaps are those related to Latino
student SAT performance and the percentage of Latino students who are college-
ready. Here, Table 4.4 reports that these secondary gaps are not significantly influ-
enced by Latino representation within management. It appears that when taking
into account the influence of Latino teachers, Latino superintendents are no longer
linked in a significant manner to the secondary gap reported in the final column
of Table 4.4. The lack of a significant relationship between the presence of a Latino
superintendent and gaps in secondary areas of performance is suggestive of the
notion that minority managers focus most of their eﬀorts on one area of perfor-
mance.
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Table 4.3: Latino Superintendents and Outcome Gaps
TAAS/TAKS SAT College-Bound
Pass Rate Gap Exam Gap Gap
Latino Superintendents -0.656** -2.433 -1.010*
(0.287) (3.247) (0.594)
Prior Period TAAS/TAKS Gap 0.399***
(0.0107)
Prior Period SAT Exam Gap 0.251***
(0.021)
Prior Period College-Bound Gap 0.175***
(0.017)
Teacher Salary ($1,000s) -0.185*** 0.705 0.076
(0.0336) (0.443) (0.076)
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.236*** -2.013* -0.361**
(0.0719) (1.173) (0.179)
Average Teacher Experience 0.109*** 1.108** 0.364***
(0.040) (0.540) (0.096)
Instructional Expenditures Per Pupil ($1,000s) 0.00029* -0.000 0.000
(0.00016) (0.003) (0.000)
Latino Student Percentage 0.039*** 0.119 0.041***
(0.006) (0.103) (0.015)
Black Student Percentage 0.039*** 0.413*** 0.118***
(0.008) (0.111) (0.019)
Low Income Student Percentage -0.009 0.370*** -0.024
(0.007) (0.100) (0.018)
Constant 13.89*** 42.47* 12.13***
(1.404) (23.130) (3.584)
N 9,894 2,602 3,819
R2 0.33 0.18 0.08
F 178.7 23.66 12.45
Standard errors in parentheses
Year dummy variables not reported
* p< :10, ** p< :05, *** p< :01
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To be clear, exactly how minority managers focus on one area is not fully ex-
plicated by these models. In general, public managers influence organizational
performance in a variety of ways. Yet one of the arguments presented herein is
that managers will “focus” on the gap in performance linked to their organiza-
tion’s politically salient performance objectives. Here, focusing on one area of per-
formance conceivably includes a variety of actions. This could include spending
more time with important actors that can influence politically important areas of
performance (e.g. mid-level managers or outside consultants). It might also in-
clude creating an organizational culture that rewards improvements in one area of
performance, which in turn could make additional eﬀorts to improve other areas
less appealing to organizational personnel. In the same way that a CEO empha-
sizes profit maximization at their firm’s annual gathering of stockholders, a focus
on a single area of performance could also suggest that top-level managers are en-
gaging in a form of political rhetoric that underscores one performance objective
at organizational meetings or with reporters in mass media. All of these are plau-
sible rationales, and to the extent that they occur, these focusing-activities would
presumably result in at least some of the intended outcomes.
It should also be noted that within the first column in Table 4.4, the results
also indicate that the presence of Latino teachers is not significantly linked with
improvements in the standardized exam performance gaps. Within academic lit-
erature and general public discourse, much has been made about “teaching to the
test” in pubic schools (Menken 2006). To the extent that this occurs, one might
expect that Latino teachers significantly influence this area of Latino student per-
formance. The finding reported in the first column of Table 4.4 suggests otherwise,
and also runs contrary to what other researchers have found regarding the perfor-
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mance improvements that come as a result of teacher representation (for example
Pitts 2007; Roch and Pitts 2012).
Representation within the organization’s street level is negatively related to
both secondary gaps, but the coeﬃcient estimates indicate that this relationship
is significant only in the case of the Latino SAT exam gap. Here, Latino teachers
are significantly associated with improvements in this area of performance. While
this finding suggests that the presence of Latino teachers can help diminish the gap
that separates Latino andwhite students in terms of average SAT performance, the
same conclusion cannot be reached in terms of the college-bound gap.
4.6 Discussion and Implications
In this paper a theory of strategic representation in public organizational set-
tings was presented. The theory is concerned with active representation and mi-
nority policy outcomes, a theme that many in the literature have discussed within
a variety of public settings. Whether public organizations serve the needs of mi-
norities is important because the face of the United States continues to diversify.
The theory advanced by this study adds to existing knowledge by focusing on how
active representation in public organizations occurs from the perspective ofminor-
ity managers that engage in a decision-making process that bears important social
implications.
Performance objectives are not a set of considerations reserved solely for private
sector firms. Performance is now at the fore of agendas throughout the public sec-
tor. It stands to reason that a discussion ofminoritymanagers as active representa-
tives should not disregard the significance of performance objectives, specifically
as it relates to the pursuit of multiple performance objectives. Public managers are
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Table 4.4: Latino Superintendents, Teachers, and Outcome Gaps
TAAS/TAKS SAT College-Bound
Pass Rate Gap Exam Gap Gap
Latino Superintendents -0.681** 3.560 -0.555
(0.335) (3.420) (0.672)
Latino Teacher Percentage 0.001 -0.430*** -0.026
(0.008) (0.104) (0.019)
Prior Period TAAS/TAKS Gap 0.399***
(0.011)
Prior Period SAT Exam Gap 0.245***
(0.021)
Prior Period College-Bound Gap 0.174***
(0.017)
Teacher Salary ($1,000s) -0.185*** 0.799* 0.086
(0.033) (0.441) (0.076)
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.237*** -1.288 -0.297
(0.074) (1.193) (0.188)
Average Teacher Experience 0.109*** 1.235** 0.362***
(0.040) (0.542) (0.096)
Instructional Expenditures Per Pupil ($1,000s) 0.000286* -0.000 0.000
(0.000162) (0.003) (0.000)
Latino Student Percentage 0.042*** 0.416*** 0.055***
(0.007) (0.121) (0.018)
Black Student Percentage 0.039*** 0.416*** 0.117***
(0.008) (0.110) (0.019)
Low Income Student Percentage -0.009 0.303*** -0.026
(0.007) (0.102) (0.018)
Constant 13.92*** 25.19 10.64***
(1.435) (23.650) (3.786)
N 9,894 2,602 3,819
R2 0.33 0.19 0.08
F 170.6 23.74 12.02
Standard errors in parentheses
Year dummy variables not reported
* p< :10, ** p< :05, *** p< :01
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constrained in their decision making andmust decide which areas of performance
will take precedent over others. This is a decision that has direct implications for
minority clientele who require substantial improvements in how they are served
by various public programs.
If indeed minority managers take it upon themselves to pursue the interests
of minorities, then focusing on one area of organizational performance suggests
that only certain policy outcomes can be improved. In this way, addressing the
performance-driven culture that influences managers, including those for whom
minority issues are highly salient, can help researchers understand organizational
settings where the hiring of minority managers fails to yield the intended perfor-
mance outcomes. Theorizing about the process of active representation by minor-
ity managers while accounting for the salience of performance is not only a useful
and insightful endeavor, it is also an imperative one given the increasing complex-
ity of today’s public sector demands.
This study provides initial evidence of strategic representation within educa-
tional organizations using a large-N quantitative approach. It finds that within
public school districts, the benefits that Latino students derive from representa-
tion by Latino superintendents appear to be highest in the context of high-stakes
testing. The findings suggest that superintendents place less emphasis on other
areas of performance. There are surely a variety of mechanisms that shape the de-
cisionsmade by Latino superintendents, and some of these importantmechanisms
are beyond the scope of the current study. For example, existing theory posits that
minority bureaucrats can change the behavior of minority clientele in a way that
produces favorable minority outcomes.
86
However, current research tells us little about this relationship in the context
of organizations that are already failing to meet certain expectations. Therefore,
one can not rule out the possibility that Latino superintendents are doing some-
thing that changes theway Latino students approach their own scholastic develop-
ment. It could also be the case that Latino representation changes theway that non-
Latino students perform. Either relationship could influence gaps in educational
achievement. Unfortunately, one of the potential limitations of this study is the
lack of individual level data required to examine these possible relationships. As
researchers begin to examine disparities along the lines of race, gender, or profes-
sional occupation in other types of organizational performance, individual-level
indicators should be examined in an attempt to overcome this limitation.
In the vein of how performance influences management’s response to minor-
ity clientele, future research should be mindful of any cross-racial dynamics that
influence organizational outcomes. For instance, how might African American
administrators respond to Latino student performance in high pressure settings?
Does this response diﬀer from that of Latino managers and, if so, then why? As
the data in this study suggest, Latinos occupy the largest presence of minority su-
perintendents in the state of Texas. Yet, Texas schools are but one setting within a
specific policy context where performance accountability is omnipresent.
Taken alone, the current study cannot account for any social dynamics that
might drive non-Latino minorities to respond more or less favorably to students
who are Latino. Had the focus of this study been on African American students,
a question that might naturally arise is how their performance figures look not
only when African Americans are at the helm, but under the guidance of other
minorities as well. Therefore, is it diﬃcult to ascertain whether the theory and
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evidence oﬀered herein generalize to organizational settings comprised of greater
levels of diversity in management.
This study sheds important and much needed empirical light on a broader
question that carries significant theoretical and practical implications; some of the
findings are suggestive and supportive. There do appear to be diﬀerential man-
agerial influences in the context of multiple outcomes gaps. However, this initial
support is found within the context of one policy setting. In order to understand
the decisions made by minority managers, and whether performance objectives
attenuate their ability to serve minority interests, the relationship between per-
formance gaps and representation in public bureaucracies should be explored in
additional settings. The findings of such research have the potential to deepen the
current understanding of those policy areas most likely to be improved by repre-
sentation in public sector management.
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5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Educating Latinos: Will Demographics Ever Become Destiny?
As the Latino population in the U.S. has grown, so to have the claims regarding
the ways in which this demographic is poised to transform prominent segments
of the country’s landscape. These claims are made despite many empirical indica-
tions that demographic strength, taken alone, has not led to the transformation that
many have anticipated. The numbers do not lie; Latinos’ demographic presence in
the U.S. is growing. Still, this trend is not new. Latinos’ share of the population has
trended upward for decades now. Many still await the day when demographics
will become destiny.
The growth of the Latino demographic has given rise to an abundance of schol-
arship that encompasses multiple disciplines. Within much of this work, Latinos
are referred to as a sleeping giant. It is a monicker intended to encapsulate the
disconnect between Latinos’ growing population presence and their paradoxical
lack of influence in the social, political, and economic arenas. If there is a com-
mon thread that unifies the broadening research on the Latino demographic, it
is the evidence concerning the relationship between population size and Latinos’
position in the polity; in their pursuit of upward mobility, population strength is
a necessary condition but not a suﬃcient one. In education, the Latino clientele
that K-12 bureaucracies serve also represent a giant that has yet to awaken. It is
therefore crucial to ask the following question: Will future generations of Latino
students experience parity in educational opportunities and outcomes?
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Any acceptable answer to this question must be situated within the broader
context of the political and policy disparities that persist along racial and eth-
nic lines, for such inequality provides strong evidence that numbers alone do not
result in substance. For decades now, these inequities have left many minority
groups on unequal footing within society’s most critical spaces, and have placed
many in a state of seemingly perpetual disadvantage.
For the Latino demographic, perhaps themost egregious manifestation of such
inequities are the disparate conditions that many Latino students face in school
systems across the county. The in-school disparities confronting Latino students
are not only long-standing, they appear to be deepening inmany cases. Andwhile
there is no panacea for Latinos’ educational disparity, this dissertation is an at-
tempt to reveal that the political and bureaucratic forces that dominate educational
organizations are important drivers of the dilemmas in Latino education.
Although the inner-workings of school bureaucracy can help explain these con-
ditions, they alone cannot account for all of the obstacles that Latino students face.
The disparate policy outcomes and lack of access to equitable learning environ-
ments that are emblematic of many Latinos’ school experiences can be attributed
to many of the challenges facing the broader Latino community. Such obstacles
include questions of citizenship, discrimination, and marginalization in settings
other than schools. In addition, many Latino students must work to shoulder eco-
nomic burdens at home that make educational attainment a secondary considera-
tion.
Still, inequality is now a permanent feature of American education, to the de-
gree that one might consider it bizarre to observe a school system operating with-
out disparities. The institutions that govern the selection of school boardmembers,
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the decision to hire more (or less) minority bureaucrats, and the choice to imple-
ment certain policies over others are among the key determinants of how much
inequality one observes.
I have argued that these features of the education system shape where Lati-
nos find themselves in the mosaic of U.S. democracy. At the same time, there
are also implications for non-Latino populations that should not be understated.
Performance-driven accountability is nowa cornerstone ofK-12 education. Schools
and teachers across the country have focused their eﬀorts on improving their per-
formance on key tests, all in according with internationally-accepted performance
metrics. The CommonCore State Standards initiative is themost recent policy that
has emanated from the performance culture in education. In the future, Latino stu-
dents will be too numerous to ignore. And any and all policy initiatives linked to
aggregate performance benchmarks will be unachievable in the presence of insti-
tutions, organizations, and policies that hinder Latinos’ academic progress.
5.2 Moving Existing Literature Forward
Public school systems represent a set of organizations that are more than pas-
sive deliverers of education policies. They are also public organizations subject
to many of the same pressures that governmental bureaucracies in general must
confront. Furthermore, they are also arenas of electoral politics where local com-
munities vie for a political voice in the policy process. To date, the politics and
public administration of Latino education are areas of research that remain under-
developed in comparison to other strands of Latino-focused scholarship.
Furthermore, there have been few attempts to weave together literatures from
various disciplines in a manner that produces meaningful insights. Education
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scholars have generally placed little emphasis on the variables that political scien-
tists have traditionally concerned themselveswith. At the same time,most political
scientists have left much of the work to be done in Latino education in the hands
of education experts with less knowledge of politics’ influence on policy outcomes
or, in many cases, a comparatively narrow conception of politics in general. This
has limited the development of the literature on Latinos and education.
In addition to all of this, two elephants in the room remain: the divide be-
tween politics and public administration (and policy), and the absence of race as an
important mainstream issue within the broader public administration literature.
Somewhere in the middle, studies in the field of public administration, largely re-
garded as separate from mainstream political science literature, have shouldered
some of the burden by studying Latinos. There have, however, been some mean-
ingful contributions in this regard.
Still, such contributions have been limited in number and also limited in their
scope; beyond a relative handful of representative bureaucracy studies, public ad-
ministration scholarship lags well behind political science in its treatment of the
Latino demographic as one deserving of any meaningful and sustained attention
in their literature. Approaching the Latino demographic as a segment of policy
consumers thatwill havemeaningful impacts on howmany organizations perform
in the future is one way to overcome this.
The pursuit of a meaningful leap forward in the existing literature requires
serious eﬀorts to bind together research insights from multiple disciplines in a
manner that breaks down artificial disciplinary boundaries. There is much room
for improvement in scholarly approaches to studying organizational phenomena
characterized by a real-world interdependence of politics and public administra-
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tion. Such an improvement would require that scholars acknowledge intrinsically
related literatures – such as political science and public administration – can be of
greater utility when considered as pieces of the same larger puzzle.
As an example, public organizations governed by a publicly elected board are,
by their structural nature, subject to the influence of politics. Nonetheless, this
is but one example of the intersection of politics and administration that is ripe
for future studies. Even in the absence of a governing board, how organizations
engage with Latinos and other communities of color is bound to be influenced by
political forces. A deeper understanding of how policies aﬀect Latino students
must account for Latino-salient features such noncitizenship and marginalization
or discrimination in governmental settings. In the context of Latinos in education
and other policy areas, a greater recognition, and broader conceptualization, of the
politics-administration confluence should prove highly useful in future research
eﬀorts.
5.3 Deriving Sustainable Solutions for an Unsustainable Problem
It is also important to consider the practical implications of this project. This
dissertation examines various institutional and administrative elements of the ed-
ucational process that have significant ramifications for Latinos’ academic achieve-
ment. Some of the most salient features of this dissertation’s analyses represent
aspects of school governance that district oﬃcials can change to increase Latinos’
chances of succeeding academically. Oﬃcials modify the institutions that shape
the outcomes of their school board elections and influence Latinos’ chances ofwin-
ning school board seats. Administrators can decide to hire more Latino teachers,
and Latino teachers can to decide how and when to implement certain policies.
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Policymakers and school administratorswould dowell to recognize opportuni-
ties to modify these elements in ways that equalize opportunities for Latinos – and
other students of color – to improve their school performance. With an increasing
presence of Latino students, our education system’s success or failure to achieve its
macro-performance objectives will be predicated upon its ability to create political
and policy environments that do not hinder Latinos’ academic mobility. It is also
important to consider the impact of these institutions as organizations that imple-
ment policies in communities of Latinos and other groups that are traditionally
underserved by public sector bureaucracies.
Education has been the policy focus of this dissertation. However, the com-
ponents of this dissertation speak to much more than education outcomes alone.
Latinos’ future education outcomes and relationship with school bureaucracies
are bound to influence their relationship with other crucial organizations. As
other scholars have noted, a group’s relationshipwith governmental organizations
also shapes that group’s much broader standing in society. As such, interplay be-
tween Latino communities and public school systems will continue to determine
where the Latino group stands in relation to other groups in a democratic system.
This dissertation takes an important step towards improving our understanding of
where Latinos’ standingwith one set of essential organizations portends forwhere
they might stand in the future.
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